BIOLOGY, CULTURE, AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR by JIANG YUSHI
  



















(MA. University of Konstanz) 
 
A THESIS SUBMITTED  




DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 











I hereby declare that this thesis is my original 
work and it has been written by me in its entirety. 
I have duly acknowledged all the sources of 
information which have been used in the thesis. 
 
This thesis has also not been submitted for any 












Foremost, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor Prof. 
Chew Soo Hong for supporting my PhD study. Prof. Chew provided me all 
possible kinds of guidance, motivation, and expertise that I needed for my 
research. He is the kind of person who is always responsive and responsible 
whenever help is needed. He is fun, smart, enthusiastic and energetic, and has 
brought tremendous positivity to my research life. Without him, none of my 
work would be possible! 
Besides Prof. Chew, another mentor that I will forever be thankful to is 
Prof. Richard P Ebstein, the co-director who leads our B2ESS group together 
with Prof Chew. As my thesis committee member, Prof. Ebstein has offered 
continuous support and inspiration to my study more than I could ever expect. 
His immense wisdom and unremitting pursuit for genuine knowledge makes 
him an excellent example of a true scientific researcher and professor. 
I also thank the rest of my thesis committee: Dr. Robin Chark and Dr. 
Roy Chen for their insightful comments and suggestions. Robin has been 
helpful since the beginning of my PhD study, his advices inspired my work in 
many ways and encouraged me to move forward even during hard times. Roy 
is a wonderful teacher, who gave me important instructions on experimental 
 iii 
 
techniques and analytical skills, I will always be grateful for their generous 
sharing. 
I would particularly like to give my thanks to every former and current 
member in the B2ESS group. I am especially indebt to Dr. Zhong Songfa for 
his enormous amount of help and teaching throughout these years, and more 
importantly, he was always there to show me the correct direction whenever I 
felt lost in my academic journey. I am also grateful to other fellow researchers 
and comrades in our group: my brilliant co-auther Dr. Mikhail Monakhov; 
former members Dr. Idan Shalev, Dr. Miao Bin, and Dr. Shen Qiang; fellow 
students Anne Chong, Lee Jiyeon, Lu Yunfeng, Yang Guangpu, Zhang Xing, 
Foo See Zuo, and Yim Onn Siong, for their constant help with my work, their 
presents undoubtedly made my PhD life more colorful and memorable.  
Furthermore, I have to give me special thanks to all B2ESS collaborators, 
especially Prof. Lai Poh San and Dr Chiea Chuen Khor, for providing 
indispensible resources and expertise to our interdisciplinary research.  
Faculty members at the department of Economics in NUS also deserve 
my sincere thanks for extending their help at various phases this my PhD study, 
these professors and teaching staffs provided the most enlightening classes in 
economic theory and analytical methods that are helpful to my own study. 
Their comments and questions in my presentations helped me to improve my 
 iv 
 
work to a considerable extent. 
I am deeply thankful to all fellow students and friends at NUS for all the 
great time we shared. My friends in PhD room 1 are like family to me, they 
are the sources of laughter and joy, accompany and support. With all these 
friends around, I never felt lonely! 
My greatest indebtedness is to my lovely family. My parents gave me 
their deepest love, support and sacrifices, I owe them everything and just wish 
to show them how much I love and appreciate them. My husband is the most 
caring and selfless man I have ever seen, he encouraged me to pursue my own 
dream despite this makes us ten thousand kilometers apart; he takes all family 
responsibilities on his own without a single word of complaint, and keeps 
taking care of me in all possible ways one could imagine. I have to thank my 
dear parents in law, who gave me the freedom to complete my study before I 
think about my role as a daughter, without their support I could never 
complete my work. I would like to delicate this work to my lost grandpa who 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS   ............................................................................ ii
SUMMARY   .................................................................................................. vii
LIST OF TABLES   .......................................................................................... x
LIST OF FIGURES   ...................................................................................... xii
ESSAY 1: Dopamine D4 Receptor Gene Exon III Polymorphism Predicts 
Risk Attitude in Han Chinese   .................................................................................. 1
1.1  Introduction   .............................................................................................. 2
1.2  A tone-based model   ................................................................................. 6
1.3  Methods  .................................................................................................... 7
1.3.1  Participants   ........................................................................................ 7
1.3.2  Behavioral experiments   ..................................................................... 8
1.3.3  Genotyping   ...................................................................................... 11
1.3.4  Statistical analysis   ........................................................................... 12
1.4  Results   .................................................................................................... 13
1.4.1  Model-free OLR analysis   ................................................................ 15
1.4.2  Computational model   ...................................................................... 18
1.4.3  Personality traits   .............................................................................. 21
1.5  Discussion   .............................................................................................. 22
ESSAY 2: Dopamine D4 Receptor Gene and Religious Affiliation 
Contribute to Altruistic Giving in the Dictator Game: Evidence for Gene x Culture 
Interaction   .............................................................................................................. 31
2.1  Introduction   ............................................................................................ 32
2.2  A-M Classification   ................................................................................. 38
2.3  Methods  .................................................................................................. 40
2.3.1  Participants   ...................................................................................... 40
2.3.2  Behavioral experiment   .................................................................... 41
2.3.3  Royal Free Interview for religious beliefs   ...................................... 41
 vi 
 
2.3.4  Genotyping   ...................................................................................... 41
2.3.5  Statistical analysis   ........................................................................... 42
2.4  Results   .................................................................................................... 43
2.4.1  Religious affiliation and DRD4 genotypes   ..................................... 43
2.4.2  A-M DG and sharing rules   .............................................................. 44
2.4.3  Effects of religious affiliation moderated by DRD4 exon III 
genotype   .............................................................................................................. 45
2.4  Discussion   .............................................................................................. 51
ESSAY 3: Fear or Fair: An Experimental Study on Competitiveness in the 
Loss Domain   .......................................................................................................... 56
3.1  Introduction   ............................................................................................ 57
3.2  Theory and hypotheses   .......................................................................... 59
3.2.1  Inequity aversion (F-S model)   ........................................................ 59
3.2.2  Prospect theory   ................................................................................ 60
3.2.3  Hypotheses   ...................................................................................... 61
3.3  Methods  .................................................................................................. 62
3.3.1  Participants   ...................................................................................... 62
3.3.2  Procedure   ........................................................................................ 63
3.3.3  Experiment 1: Inequity aversion   ..................................................... 64
3.3.4  Experiment 2: Competitiveness   ...................................................... 66
3.3.5  Experiment 3: Risk attitude   ............................................................. 68
3.4  Results   .................................................................................................... 70
3.4.1  Summary statistics   .......................................................................... 70
3.4.2  Result 1 (Inequity aversion)   ............................................................ 72
3.4.3  Result 2 (Risk attitude)   ................................................................... 75
3.4.4  Robustness check   ............................................................................ 78
3.5  Discussion   .............................................................................................. 81
BIBLIOGRAPHY   ......................................................................................... 86




Biology, culture, and economic behavior: three seemingly distinct subjects are 
integrated into one in this thesis, presented in three essays. Economic behavior 
provides the common thread of research focus throughout this thesis. We start 
from individual decision making viz. financial risk taking, followed by social 
decision making in terms of altruistic giving, and at the final stop we examine 
how these two aspects of preferences associate with competition behavior. On 
the one hand, we dig into the biological foundation of economic decision 
making and seek to understand how risk attitude and social preferences are 
hardwired in our very genome at the molecular level, as elaborated in Essay 1 
and 2; on the other hand, the discussion incorporates additionally the role of 
culture and evolution as reflected in Essay 2 and 3. 
In the first essay we examine how the Dopamine D4 Receptor (DRD4) 
gene links to risk attitude. In this study we elicited risk preference using three 
incentivized behavioral games: a Financial investment task, an Even-chance 
lottery and a Sure-bet task. We further applied a computational approach based 
on economic theory to estimate the risk aversion coefficient, which we 
examined for its relationship with DRD4 in a large group of 3433 Han Chinese. 
Our results showed that the exon III 4R/4R genotype, which encodes a more 
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efficient receptor protein, was robustly associated with greater concavity of 
utility function and hence greater degree of risk aversion, confirming previous 
finding in a large and independent ethnic group. 
In the second essay, we study how religion and DRD4 jointly shape 
human altruistic giving behavior as measured with the 
Andreoni-Miller Dictator Game. This game enabled us to clearly specify 
(non-)selfishness, efficiency, and fairness motives for sharing. Subjects were 
further classified into distinct religious categories (Christian, Buddhist-Tao, 
and No Religion) based on self reports. Our analysis revealed a significant 
interaction effect of religion and DRD4 on altruistic giving: whereas there was 
no significant effect of religion observed in the majority 4R/4R genotype group, 
we did see a significant difference between Christian and non-Christians in the 
non-4R/4R group, with Christians being overall more altruistic (less selfish and 
fairer) than non-Christians. These results support the vantage sensitivity 
hypothesis regarding DRD4 that the non-4R/4R ‘susceptibility’ genotype is 
more responsive to a positive environment provided by religion. 
The last essay investigates how risk attitude and social preferences are 
linked to competitiveness in both gain and loss domains. On a student sample of 
108 Han Chinese recruited at NUS, competitiveness was measured via 
self-selecting into a tournament involving real effort tasks. In the gain domain, 
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consistent with existing literature, our results demonstrated that both risk 
aversion over gains and envy were linked to lower competitiveness. However, 
none of this was observed in the loss domain. Surprisingly, we found that risk 
aversion over losses is associated with higher competitiveness in the loss 
domain. These results are consistent with the biological findings that gains and 
losses are processed in different brain areas and would likely lead to different 
emotions. To our knowledge this is the first study that examines how risk and 
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ESSAY 1: Dopamine D4 Receptor Gene Exon III 




1.1  Introduction 
“Risk is a part of God's game, alike for men and nations.” - Warren Buffett 
Risk is pervasive and attitudes towards risk, in particular financial risk, 
have consequences for individuals, households and firms. Moreover, it is 
widely recognized that individuals markedly differ in their attitude toward 
financial risk taking, inter alia as well as risky behaviors, and the source of 
these differences are of considerable interest toward understanding not only 
this fundamental human trait but also the working of markets in the global 
economy. Focusing on individual differences on risk attitude is therefore the 
most natural starting point for our journey towards understanding biological 
foundation of economic behavior. 
Similar to other complex human behaviors, twin studies suggest that 
between 20-60% of the individual variance in financial risk taking can be 
explained by genes (Cesarini et al., 2009, Le et al., 2010, Zhong et al., 2009a, 
Zyphur et al., 2009), while more recently small-scale molecular genetic 
studies have started down the road towards identifying specific genes 
contributing to financial risk attitude (Carpenter et al., 2011, Dreber and 
Apicella, 2009, Dreber et al., 2012, Dreber et al., 2011a, Frydman et al., 2011, 
Kuhnen and Chiao, 2009, Roe et al., 2009). 
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 Risk preference can be revealed via choices between uncertain and 
sure payoffs. The assumption that individuals are risk averse over monetary 
payoffs is pervasive, in which case the Certainty Equivalent (CE), namely the 
sure amount which the decision maker finds to be the worth of a lottery, is 
lower than the expected value of it. In this study, we used three tasks to elicit 
risk preference: a Financial investment task in which subjects decide how to 
allocate an endowment between a risky asset and cash (Dreber and Apicella, 
2009, Dreber et al., 2011a, Kuhnen and Chiao, 2009), an Even-chance lottery 
task with the price list representation that measures risk attitude via choices of 
CE of a given lottery (Holt and Laury, 2002, Miller et al., 1969), as well as a 
Sure-bet task which gave subjects the option to choose between a fixed sure 
amount and lotteries with varying probabilities of winning (Andreoni and 
Sprenger, 2011, Farquhar, 1984). 
Although all three tasks could assess individual’s degree of risk aversion, 
the framing of the Financial investment task resembles a modern investment 
environment whereas the tasks involving lotteries focus on the more 
fundamental and core topography of risk attitude: the direct comparison 
between smaller probability of higher pay-off and a certain outcome of lower 
payoff. Moreover, building on standard economic theory, we could apply a 
computational method to estimate the risk aversion coefficient by combining 
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all three tasks; this theoretically derived phenotype has a quantitative meaning. 
The computational approach has gained increasing application in behavioral 
genetic studies (Tan et al., 2009). By quantifying and assigning numerical 
value to our phenotype we add a gene-based dimension to valuation process 
and thereby attain a deeper understanding of financial decision making. Gene 
variants may be seen as population related variables that can be entered into 
any economic model, similar to demographic variables (viz., sex, geography, 
age etc.) and are potentially equally informative towards a more accurate 
description of economic agents. 
Models built upon competing economic theories have been compared to 
fit the data, including the most classic Expected Utility Theory (EUT) (von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), the well known Prospect Theory (PT) 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), as well as the Mean-variance model (MV) 
(Markowitz, 1952). All of these models could be used to assess the degree of 
risk aversion via relevant parameters, and thus provide a powerful and 
tractable tool to understand the genetic basis of risk attitude by generating a 
phenotype which we suggest is close to the neurochemical substrate 
underpinning the brain’s reward valuation processes (Trepel et al., 2005). In 
particular, EUT modeled the utility of a lottery as the average utility of all 
possible outcomes weighted by corresponding probabilities. Based on EUT, a 
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decision maker is said to be risk averse (neutral/seeking) if and only if his/her 
utility function is concave (linear/convex). Furthermore, the curvature of the 
utility function corresponds to the degree of risk aversion of the decision 
maker: a more “curved” concave utility function indicates a higher degree of 
risk aversion, while a “flatter” utility function implies less risk aversion. In 
comparison, PT captures several features in human risk attitude that could not 
be well explained by EUT, by incorporating a convex value function in the 
loss domain and a non-linear probability weighing function. This theory has 
profound implications particularly for uncertainties involving losses and 
long-shot probabilities. Finally, the MV model focuses on the trade-off 
between expected return and the risk (variance of return) of financial 
portfolios, and has wide application in financial asset valuation and portfolio 
selection. Among these competing models, the one with the best model fit has 
been selected for computational analysis. 
A gene that has gained much attention in its association with human risk 
attitude and risky behaviors (Barnes et al., 2011, Dreber et al., 2011a, Ebstein, 
2006, Eisenegger et al., 2010, Kuhnen and Chiao, 2009, McGeary, 2009, 
Munafo et al., 2008) is the dopamine D4 receptor (DRD4) gene. This gene has 
a 48bp variable number of tandem repeats polymorphism (VNTR) in exon III 
(Lichter et al., 1993, Rondou et al., 2010). One to eleven repeats of the VNTR 
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are observed in humans (Li et al., 1999) and the most common is the 4-Repeat 
(4R), followed by the 7-Repeat (7R) in non-Asian populations (Chang et al., 
1996, Ding et al., 2002, Wang et al., 2004) and the 2-Repeat (2R) in East Asia. 
Importantly, the exon III VNTR variants confer functional specificity to the 
DRD4 receptor with the DRD4 4R/4R protein being the most efficient 
receptor by several criteria (Asghari et al., 1995, Van Craenenbroeck et al., 
2011, Van Craenenbroeck et al., 2005b, Van Tol, 1996). This 
well-characterized polymorphism suggests to us DRD4 as a leading candidate 
to contribute to individual differences in the utility function. 
1.2  A tone-based model 
Pervasive evidences have shown that the firing of DA neuron in midbrain area 
is linked to reward prediction (Schultz et al., 1997), and thus it is likely that 
the DA tone in the relevant brain area would play an indispensable role in the 
reward process. In support of this view, our previous study (Zhong et al., 
2009b) has suggested a tone-based hypothesis, and shown that polymorphic 
dopaminergic genes can affect human risk taking behavior by partially 
regulating dopamine (DA) tone, a variable that involves synaptic DA release, 
uptake, metabolism and most saliently receptor binding. 
The tone model is built upon the receptor occupancy theory and 
biological constraint hypotheses proposed by Berns et al. (2007) that the 
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cellular response to a stimulus is a consequence of the neurotransmitter 
binding to its receptor. In this model, the shape of the cellular response 
function is governed by an exponential factor α that describes the cellular 
response efficiency to receptor activation. Given the model specification, 
Berns et al. (2007) further showed that a more efficient system (and thus 
higher tone) corresponding to lower α would result in a more concave 
response function in the gain domain. Naturally, for the mesolimbic dopamine 
system, whose responses to reward can be considered as utility, the concavity 
of cellular response function implies the concavity of utility function in 
economic models, a more efficient system (higher tone) would lead to a more 
concave utility function which translates into greater degree of risk aversion in 
behavior. 
Based on this model, we hypothesize that carriers of the 4R/4R most 
common genotype, coding for the most efficient DRD4 receptor protein, 
would have the most concave utility function and thus are most risk averse. 
1.3  Methods 
Subjects were recruited via email advertisement from National University of 
Singapore and various universities in Beijing, only Han Chinese 
1.3.1  Participants 
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undergraduates were invited to the experiment. After participated in 
incentivized laboratory-based economic experiments, subjects donated 
biological material samples (blood or saliva) and then were invited to 
complete online surveys including personality questionnaires. All participants 
gave informed written consent prior to participating. The study was approved 
by the Institution Review Board of National University of Singapore. Subjects 
were compensated for participation in the project (on average S$25 per hour in 
Singapore and ￥100 per hour in Beijing: we set the ￥ amount four times as 
large as the S$ amount based on comparisons of average income and 
purchasing power in these two cities). Behavioral data was available for 3510 
subjects, and the DRD4 exon III VNTR was genotyped successfully in 3433 of 
them, which gave us a statistical power of ~75% with an alpha of 0.05. Among 
the subjects with non-missing DRD4 data, 1,640 were males; 2,191 were from 
Singapore (46.1% males) and 1,242 were recruited from Beijing (51.7% 
males). The mean age was 21.9 years (S.D. = 2.3) for males and 20.8 years 
(S.D. = 2.4) for females. The summary statistics for demographic variables are 
reported in Table S1.1.A. 
Three incentivized laboratory economic games were used to elicit risk 
preferences: the Financial investment task, the Even-chance lottery task, and 
1.3.2  Behavioral experiments 
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the Sure-bet task. These methods have been widely used in experimental 
economics to measure risk preferences. Printed instructions were distributed 
and subjects indicated their preferences by ticking appropriate boxes in paper 
forms. Detailed experimental instructions are available in Appendix 1.B. 
Financial investment. In the Financial investment task, subjects were 
given an initial endowment of S$27 (￥108 in Beijing), and were asked to 
decide how much to invest in an experimental stock while keeping the rest as 
cash. For every dollar invested, there was a 50% chance of receiving S$2.5 
and 50% chance of losing all the investment. For example, if a subject 
invested X dollars in the experimental stock, then his final payoff from this 
task would be either S$27 + 1.5X or S$27 - X, with equal probabilities. 
Instead of allowing subjects to write down the exact amount of investment, we 
constrained our subjects to ten investment options, with the amount of 
investment ranging from S$0 to 27 (￥0 to 108 in Beijing), in ascending 
manner at an incremental value of S$3 (￥12 in Beijing). In this manner, we 
could use the serial number of the chosen option to proxy one’s risk attitude as 
a higher number indicated a larger investment in the risky stock, and thus less 
risk aversion. Note that in this task, we could only measure the extent of risk 
aversion without distinguishing risk neutrality and risk affinity, since both risk 
neutral and risk seeking subjects will always invest all endowments (the 
expected profit of the experimental stock is strictly larger than zero). 
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Even-chance lottery. The Even-chance lottery task was a price list with 
ten rows of binary choices, and for each row subjects needed to choose 
between option A, a lottery with 50% chance of receiving S$60 (￥240 in 
Beijing) and 50% chance of receiving zero, and option B, the “safe option” 
with a sure amount of payment. The lottery (Option A) was fixed for all the 10 
rows, while the “safe option” (Option B) varied from S$15 to 35 (￥60 to 140 
in Beijing) arranged in an ascending manner across the 10 rows. The serial 
number of the row at which a participant switched from the lottery (option A) 
to the “safe option” (option B) was used as a preliminary indicator of the 
participant’s risk preference, as a larger switching point implies higher 
tolerance to risk. For example, a risk neutral subject was expected to switch at 
row 7 where the amount of option B was S$30 (￥120 in Beijing), equaled the 
expected value of option A; while a switching point smaller (lager) than 7 
corresponded to risk aversion (seeking). 
Sure-bet. The Sure-bet task was similar to the Even-chance lottery but with 
reversed positions of the safe option and the lotteries, namely, option A was the 
fixed “safe option” of receiving S$30 (￥120 in Beijing) for sure, while option 
B was a list of lotteries with varying probabilities of winning (ranging from 48% 
to 66% in an ascending manner of 2% steps). The serial number of the row at 
which a participant switched from the “safe option” (option A) to the lotteries 
(option B) revealed his/her risk aversion level, specifically, a risk neutral 
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subject would switch at the second row, where the expected value of Option B 
equaled the amount of the “safe option”, S$30 (￥120 in Beijing), while risk 
averse subjects should switch later where the expected value of the lottery gets 
higher. For the consistency of analysis, we coded the responses of this task as 10 
minus the switching point, so that a higher index corresponded to higher risk 
tolerance as in the other tasks. 
Personality questionnaires
Costa and McCrae, 2010
. The questionnaires were filled online, using 
Qualtrics survey service (Qualtrics Labs Inc., Provo, UT) in Singapore and 
Sojump online survey service (www.sojump.com) in Beijing. NEO-PI and 
TCI-R questionnaires were included in two separate online surveys: the survey 
with NEO-PI was filled first, and then subjects received an invitation to 
answer the survey with TCI-R. NEO-PI-3 ( ) 
questionnaire was used for Singapore subjects. Chinese version of NEO-PI-R 
questionnaire (Yang et al., 1999) was used for Beijing subjects. Cronbach’s 
alpha values for NEO-PI domain scores were 0.85 - 0.92 in Singapore and 0.79 
- 0.92 in Beijing, TCI-R domain scores were 0.80 - 0.92 in Singapore and 0.78 - 
0.91 in Beijing, indicating sufficient levels of internal consistency. 
In Singapore DNA was extracted either from blood samples using QIAamp 
DNA Blood Midi Kit (Quiagen), or from saliva samples, collected with 
1.3.3  Genotyping 
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Oragene DNA OG-500 tubes (DNA Genotek Inc., Ontario, Canada) according 
to the manufacturer’s protocol. From Beijing samples DNA was extracted by 
BGI-Shenzhen (Shenzhen, China) and Genolab (Beijing, China) using 
TIANamp Blood DNA kit (TIANGEN Biotech Beijing Co., LTD). The DRD4 
exon III VNTR was analyzed by PCR with HotStar Plus DNA polymerase (0.3 
U/reaction), 1 × Q-solution, 1 × Coral Load buffer (Qiagen), 200 µM of each 
dNTP, 200 nM of each primer and 10-20 ng of genomic DNA per reaction, in 
volume of 10 µl. Primer sequences were: forward 5′ - 
GCGACTACGTGGTCTACTCG -3′, reverse 5′- 
AGGACCCTCATGGCCTTG -3′. Thermal protocol included activation step – 
95°C for 5 min; 40 cycles of 94°C for 30 s, 55°C for 30 s, 72°C for 40 s; and 
final hold at 72°C for 5 min. PCR products were loaded onto 1.5% agarose gel 
with ethidium bromide, run for 1 hour at 5 V/cm in TBE and visualized in UV 
camera. 
In the analyses of DRD4 exon III VNTR effects we coded the 4R/4R genotype 
as “0” and all other genotypes as “1”. To examine associations between the 
DRD4 exon III VNTR and risk attitude, we first used Ordered Logit 
Regression (OLR) to estimate the effect of DRD4 exon III VNTR on observed 
behavioral responses for each task. Additionally, we estimated the risk 
1.3.4  Statistical analysis 
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aversion coefficient based on EUT with an exponential utility function using a 
computational method. This method allowed us to combine the three tasks for 
a more meaningful and accurate analysis on risk preference (The detailed 
model specification for estimation method is available in Appendix 1.B). 
Associations between personality traits and behavioral risk attitude were 
examined via OLR and the computational approach while the effects of DRD4 
on personality traits were analyzed with linear regressions. Robust standard 
errors are used when applicable. Regression analyses were performed in Stata 
IC 11 (Stata Corp LP, College Station, TX). 
1.4  Results 
Risk attitude in the Even-chance lottery and Sure-bet task was measured with 
the switching points from the lotteries to sure amounts; and in the Financial 
investment task, it was measured with the choice of portfolio composition so 
that the responses are all coded in a way that a larger number corresponded to 
a lower level of risk aversion. We initially summarized the behavioral and 
genetic data. To check the association between DRD4 and risk attitude, we 
first tested the association between the responses in each individual task and 
the DRD4 exon III VNTR using OLR, and then tested the effect of this 
polymorphism on the risk aversion coefficient which governs the curvature of 
the exponential utility function via computational estimation. The selection of 
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this utility specification was based on the comparison of model fits among 
several most commonly used models. The effects of sex, city and age are 
controlled for in all regressions and estimations. 
At the behavioral level, subjects were on average risk averse as expected. 
In particular, as shown in Figure S1.1 risk aversion was demonstrated by 
examining the distribution of subjects’ responses in the three risk tasks: by 
choosing to keep certain amounts as cash in panel (a) Financial investment 
task; by switching earlier than at the risk-neutral point as marked on the x-axis 
of panel (b) Even-chance lottery; and panel (c) Sure-bet task. The summary 
statistics of these tasks stratified by sex and city are reported in Table S1.1.B. 
In all three tasks, females were consistently more risk averse than males 
(Financial investment: p = 0.000; Even-chance lottery: p = 0.000; Sure-bet: p 
= 0.003; two-tailed t-test). Significant difference in risk attitude between cities 
was observed only in the Even-chance lottery task (Financial investment: p = 
0.240; Even-chance lottery: p = 0.000; Sure-bet: p = 0.101; two-tailed t-test).  
At the genotype level, the frequencies of genotypes and alleles of DRD4 
exon III VNTR are shown in Table S1.2. As expected from a Chinese 
population the most common allele in this study was the 4R followed by the 
2R in contrast to Caucasian populations in which the 7R is the second most 
common allele. Around 59% of the subjects carried 4R/4R genotype, while the 
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rest carried at least one copy of minor alleles. When separate our sample by 
city, we found similar distributions of alleles and genotypes in Singapore and 
Beijing (Figure S1.2). This was consistent with earlier studies on DRD4 in 
Asian population (Reist et al., 2007). The distributions of alleles were in 
Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium in both Singapore (chi-2(26) = 32.613; p = 0.250) 
and Beijing (chi-2 (21) = 18.201; p = 0.636). 
By comparing the mean responses between 4R/4R and non-4R/4R genotypes, 
we found that the 4R/4Rcarriers were more risk averse in all three tasks 
(
1.4.1  Model-free OLR analysis 
Figure 1.1.A). We further summarized OLR regression results with robust 
standard errors in Table S1.3. Three estimation models are reported for each 
task: model (a) contains only one explanatory variable: the DRD4 gene; model 
(b) includes individual characteristics such as sex, city and age as control 
variables; and model (c) further controls for environmental variables including 
father’s education, mother’s education, number of siblings, as well as family 
income levels. 
As the starting point, we followed Dreber and Apicella (2009) to examine 
the effect of DRD4 on risk attitude using the Financial investment task, the 
results without control variables are shown in Column 1(a): the DRD4 exon III 
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VNTR was significantly associated with risk attitude towards financial 
investment with p = 0.027. The Odds Ratio (OR) of DRD4 term was 1.144, 
indicating that the odds of choosing a more risky option was 1.144 times in 
non-4R/4R carriers as large as in 4R/4R carriers, in other words, subjects with 
at least one minor allele were more risk tolerant than the 4R/4R carriers. The 
OR we observe was in the range reported for other behavioral phenotypes 
(Rietschel et al., 2012, Seifuddin et al., 2012); it remained at 1.144 with 
significance of p = 0.029 when controlling for individual characteristics 
(Column 1(b)), and was marginally significant (OR = 1.128, p = 0.065) when 
environmental control variables were further controlled for (Column1(c)). 
In addition to the Financial investment task, we further examined whether 
the observed effect of DRD4 can also be revealed in the Even-chance lottery 
task. As shown in Columns 2(a) - (c), the effect of DRD4 was significant at 10% 
and 5% levels before and after controls, respectively. Similarly, subjects with 
4R/4R genotype were more risk averse than others in all three models, and the 
odds of choosing one more lottery over the sure amount was 1.1 - 1.3 times as 
large in the non-4R/4R group compared to the 4R/4R group (Column 2(a): OR 
= 1.290, p = 0.058; 2(b): OR = 1.152, p = 0.028; 2(c): OR = 1.164, p = 0.025). 
Finally, a Sure-bet task has further been used to assess subjects’ risk 
attitude. The results for this task are summarized in Column 3(a) - (b), notably, 
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the gene effect of DRD4 was highly significant in all model specifications 
with non-4R/4R carriers being more risk tolerant, and the odds of choosing 
one more lottery over the sure amount was ~1.2 times as large in the 
non-4R/4R compared to the 4R/4R group (3(a): OR = 1.210, p = 0.002; 3(b): 
OR = 1.212, p = 0.003;  3(c): OR = 1.201, p = 0.006). 
Overall, across all three different measurements of risk attitude, albeit 
with nuanced differences, results indicated that the 4R/4R genotype increased 
the propensity for individuals to be more risk averse compared to the 
genotypes with at least one minor allele, mainly the 2R in our Chinese sample. 





A. Comparison of mean risk aversion responses between 4R/4R and non-4R/4R 
genotypes. Y-axis shows the mean responses, with higher number being less risk 
averse, 4R/4R group (blue) and non-4R/4R group (red) are compared for each task, 
and the p-values are from two-sided t-tests. We found that the non-4R/4R group tends 
to be less risk averse in all three tasks. B. Comparison of utility functions between 
4R/4R and non-4R/4R genotypes. Exponential utility functions with estimated ρ 
from the computational models (controlling for sex, age, and city) are presented for 
both genotype groups. The 4R/4R group (blue) has more concave utility function with 
ρ = 0.012 than the non-4R/4R (red) group with ρ = 0.011. 
Most importantly, to evaluate how DRD4 affects the curvature of the utility 
function, we combined the three tasks and estimated the risk aversion 
coefficient based on standard economic models. Prior to estimating the genetic 
effects, we have compared the model fits of five candidate models, including 
two EUT models with either exponential utility or power utility specifications, 
two PT models with either exponential value function or power value function 
combined with 
1.4.2  Computational model 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) probability weighing function, 
as well as a mean-variance model. Based on the Vuong likelihood ratio tests, 
the EUT model with exponential utility function showed best fit to our data 
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(Table S1.4), and therefore has been adopted as the workhorse for our 
computational analysis. Specifically, we assumed that subjects made their 
choices according to EUT and the utility of outcome m is given by: u(m) = 1 - 
exp(-ρm), where ρ > 0 is the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient, 
and a higher ρ implies higher risk aversion. 
Table 1.1 Association between DRD4 and risk aversion parameter 
ρ (a) (b) (c) 
DRD4 Non-4R/4R -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Female  0.002*** 0.002*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) 
City  0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Age  0.000 0.000 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Father edu   -0.000 
   (0. 0001) 
Mother edu   0.000 
   (0. 0001) 
Siblings   0.000* 
   (0. 0001) 
Income level   0.000 
   (0. 0001) 
Constant 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0014) (0.0015) 
Avg. ρ  0.012 0.012 0.012 
(Std. dev.) 0.0004 0.0011 0.0011 
Noise 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
Log likelihood -41203.410 -40084.986 -36014.337 
Observations 67549 65941 59379 
Clusters 3432 3353 3020 
The coefficients are presented in average marginal effects. Clustered standard errors 
are in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. : Risk aversion coefficient ρ is 
estimated as a function of individual differences. DRD4=0 if participant carries the 
4R/4R genotype, 1 otherwise.  Female = 0 if participant is male, 1 otherwise. City = 0 
if participant is recruited in Singapore, 1 if in Beijing. Age = age of participants 
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measured in years. Father’s and Mother’s education are categorized into eight ordered 
levels (1 - 8): 1 = Less than primary education, 2 = Completed primary school, 3 = 
Completed secondary school, 4 = Completed high school or equivalent, 5 = Completed 
tertiary education, including polytechnic, after secondary school, 6 = Completed 
undergraduate program with a bachelor degree, 7 = Completed postgraduate program 
with a master degree, 8 = Completed postgraduate program with a doctorate degree. 
Siblings = the number of siblings of participants. Family income has been classified 
into eight ordered levels according to the distribution of reported family annual income: 
1 = 10-percentile, 2 = 20-percentile, 3 = 40-percentile, 4 = 50-percentile, 5 = 
70-percentile, 6 = 80-percentile, 7 = 90-percentile, 8 = 100-percentile. 
Table 1.1 reports the estimation results with error terms clustered at 
individual level to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. The 
estimated average ρ was around 0.012, significantly different from zero (chi-2 
= 4289.79, p = 0.000) suggesting that subjects were on average risk averse for 
the stake given in our experiment. Specifically, as shown in column (a), the 
average ρ of minor allele carriers was 0.001 lower than the 4R/4R carriers (p = 
0.002), implying a less concave utility function and thus less risk aversion of 
minor allele carriers (Figure 1.1.B). To illustrate, an Even-chance lottery with 
winning prize of S$60 had a CE of S$24.71 for the individuals with ρ = 0.012, 
lower than its expected value of S$30; moreover, the CE of such lottery was 
S$0.39 lower for 4R/4R carriers than that for non-4R/4R carriers. The 
coefficient of DRD4 did not alter much even if we controlled for individual 
characteristics (coeff. = -0.001, p = 0.001) and environmental factors (coeff. = 
-0.001, p = 0.002), suggesting a robust effect of the gene. 
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In addition to assessing risk attitude using incentivized behavioral economic 
games, we also inventoried the majority of the subjects for two widely 
employed personality questionnaires, namely the TCI-R (
1.4.3  Personality traits 
Cloninger, 1999) and 
the NEO-PI (Costa and McCrae, 2010), which have recently been a focus of 
interest in economics (Almlund et al., 2011, Cunha and Heckman, 2009, 
Cunha et al., 2010). At least in the psychological sciences personality 
inventories have been widely used to assess risk attitudes and hence we 
thought it of considerable interest to compare such pencil and paper 
approaches to incentivized gambles. Altogether, TCI-R scores were available 
for 2110 subjects, and NEO-PI scores were available for 2571 subjects. 
Table S1.5 shows the association of TCI-R and NEO-PI scores with risk 
attitude. By conducting OLR analysis controlling for sex, city, and age, we 
found that risk attitude measured by economic experiments was significantly 
associated with Novelty seeking, Harm avoidance, Reward dependence, and 
Persistence in TCI-R, as well as with Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness 
and Agreeableness in NEO-PI. Results from the computational model with 
combined tasks also demonstrated significant association between the risk 
aversion coefficient ρ and Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness in NEO-PI, 
and Novelty seeking, as well as Harm avoidance in TCI-R. Overall, as 
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expected, those who scored high in Extraversion, Openness, Novelty Seeking, 
and scored low in Neuroticism and Harm Avoidance were less risk averse. The 
directions of correlation were consistent with those reported in the literature  
(e.g.:Lauriola and Levin, 2001, Nicholson et al., 2005) 
We further tested whether the DRD4 exon III VNTR might be also 
associated with the personality phenotypes in Table S1.6. We found that none 
of these personality traits are significantly associated with DRD4, and the 
p-values mostly range between 0.650 and 0.990. 
1.5  Discussion 
Overall, results from the current report compellingly reveal the role of the 
DRD4 exon III VNTR in contributing to individual differences in economic 
risk attitude. First of all, we have broadened the scope of previous studies 
(Dreber and Apicella, 2009, Dreber et al., 2011a, Kuhnen and Chiao, 2009) by 
including an Even-chance lottery and a Sure-bet task in addition to the 
Financial investment task, and singularly derived a computational phenotype 
from the combined tasks for an overall measure of risk attitude using the 
Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion. Secondly, the current findings also lend 
strong support for a role of the DRD4 receptor in determining dopamine tone 
(see also: David et al., 2008) as proposed in an earlier tone-based model of DA 
regulating attitude towards financial risk (Zhong et al., 2009b). Moreover, the 
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observed association between DRD4 and risk attitude is now shown to be 
robust across ethnic categories, as underscored by the current study, which 
was carried out solely in a large group of Han Chinese subjects. Finally, the 
current findings support the recent suggestion that VNTR polymorphisms, 
albeit more difficult and expensive to genotype than SNPs, have been for too 
long ignored in large genetic association studies (Brookes, 2013) and need to 
be considered as an important source of individual differences in contributing 
to complex traits. 
A rich body of evidence shows that dopamine neurons respond to 
reward-predicting stimuli (Schultz, 2004). Indeed, electrophysiological studies 
reveal that the brain’s reward system can be represented by a network 
comprising the dopamine neurons of the pars compacta of substantia nigra and 
ventral tegmental area, the striatum, orbito-frontal cortex and amygdale 
(Schultz et al., 2008). Human imaging studies support the role of this network 
in human decision making and specifically suggests its saliency in financial 
decision making as well (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005). The current results 
using a neurogenetic strategy demonstrate a role for an important element of 
dopaminergic synaptic transmission, the DRD4 receptor, towards explaining 
individual differences in risk attitude. Our findings are consistent with the 
wealth of previous studies that have demonstrated the importance of dopamine 
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neurons in reward-motivated behavior. Importantly, the neuro-genetic strategy 
contributes to understanding the intriguing question of why people differ in 
risk attitude. 
East Asian populations are characterized by the virtual absence of long 
repeats (> 4R), especially the 7R. Various schemes have been introduced 
towards grouping the exon III polymorphisms in E. Asian groups in which the 
second most common allele is the 2R (Li et al., 1997, Tomitaka et al., 1999, 
Zhong et al., 2010). Importantly, and consistent with expression and binding 
data (Asghari et al., 1995, Schoots and Van Tol, 2003, Van Craenenbroeck et 
al., 2011, Van Tol, 1998), Reist et al. (2007) have suggested that 2R acts as a 
proxy for 7R in East Asian populations. Following previous classification 
schemes commonly employed in East Asian subjects (Kang et al., 2010, Lim 
et al., 2012, Sasaki et al., 2011), and to capture all the genetic information 
represented by the highly polymorphic exon III repeat region, we compared 
the most common genotype, the 4R/4R, with all other genotypes, so that the 
common 2R and the very rare 7R as well as other minor alleles were combined 
in one group (non-4R/4R). For Caucasians samples, such classification shall 
deliver similar results as comparing 4R/4R with 7R carriers, while for East 
Asian samples this would be similar to 4R/4R versus 2R carriers’ comparison. 
Like the grouping of 2R and 7R alleles, such a grouping scheme assumes that 
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these minor alleles are likely less efficient alleles being derived from the more 
ancestral 4R and perhaps suggested by their lower population frequency 
(Tovo-Rodrigues et al., 2012). Indeed, the current study demonstrates that the 
homozygote 4R genotype is associated with greater risk aversion compared 
with genotypes with at least one minor allele; in other words, the presence of 
minor alleles makes individuals more risk tolerant. Interestingly, there is some 
evidence for positive selection at this locus (Chen et al., 1999, Naka et al., 
2012, Wang et al., 2004), although also see Naka et al. (2011) as well as Abe 
et al. (2011), Jiang et al. (2013), and Thompson et al. (2013) for further 
discussion of this gene in evolution.  
Notably, molecular studies of DRD4 receptor synthesis (Van 
Craenenbroeck et al., 2011, Van Craenenbroeck et al., 2005a) show that the 
folding efficiency is rate-limiting in the biogenesis of DRD4 and the receptor 
with only two repeats (2R) is less up-regulated compared to the receptor with 
four repeats (4R) (Van Craenenbroeck et al., 2005b). Importantly, the folding 
of DRD4 in the endoplasmic reticulum forms the bottleneck of receptor 
biosynthesis directly suggesting that the DA tone, is higher in 4R leading to a 
more concave utility functions (more risk averse) for 4R/4R carriers. As such, 
our findings strongly support the tone-based hypotheses. 
Previously only a handful of studies with Caucasian subjects, and 
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characterized by small sample sizes, used incentivized investment task to 
examine the relationship between DRD4 exon III VNTR and financial risk 
attitude (Dreber and Apicella, 2009, Dreber et al., 2012, Dreber et al., 2011a, 
Kuhnen and Chiao, 2009). Overall, it was found that the second most common 
allele, 7R, of DRD4 exon III VNTR is related to greater risk affinity compared 
to the 4R allele. In our experiment we used the same task on a large Han 
Chinese sample; in addition, we employed an Even-chance lottery and a 
Sure-bet task, which are arguably more primitive, viz. the simplest and most 
basic risk attitude compared to the investment task involving trade-off 
between a safe and a risky asset. Specifically, we suggest the notion that these 
two tasks resonate with choice situations faced by our early hunter-gatherer 
ancestors when the simplest consideration is illustrated by the adage “a bird in 
the hand is worth two in the bush”. In comparison, the Financial investment 
task mimics modern financial decision making in which investors optimize 
over portfolios of assets; it is plausible that people might respond differently to 
such a specific scenario depending on personal knowledge and financial 
experience. Moreover, as noted in the Methods section, the lottery type tasks 
(including both the Even-chance lottery and the Sure-bet task) enabled us to 
assess a wider range of risk attitude, including risk neutrality and risk affinity, 
which cannot be inferred from observed choices in the investment task. Hence 
by including these tasks, we were able to more fully map out the contours of 
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risk attitude and arrive at a more meaningful gene association. As expected, in 
all tasks, 4R/4R carriers exhibited greater degree of risk aversion, not only 
strengthening the previous findings of Dreber et al. (Dreber and Apicella, 2009, 
Dreber et al., 2011a) and Kuhnen and Chiao (2009), but more importantly 
capturing a more primitive component of risk attitude.  
We compared five competing economic models in the EUT, PT, and MV 
category, and selected the one with best fit to our data, namely, the EUT model 
with an exponential utility function. It is not surprising that a EUT model 
outperforms the PT models, although the latter category is considered to be 
more realistic in many circumstances especially for uncertainties involving 
losses and (extremely) small probabilities. The main reason could be that our 
experiments focus on one small but important niche of uncertainty, i.e., 
moderate risk in the gain domain, which can be adequately captured by a 
parsimonious EUT model, while extra model specification on probability 
weighing as in PT are likely to incur unnecessary distortions to the model fit. 
Built on the selected model, we estimated the risk aversion coefficient by 
combining the three tasks, and this economically meaningful phenotype, 
which represents the curvature of a utility function, helps to link economic risk 
attitude with biological reward process, which is shown to be associated with 
mid-brain dopamine neurons (Schultz et al., 1997). 
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We recruited a large sample of 3433 Han Chinese university students in 
our study. Unlike the few previous candidate gene studies of financial risk 
attitude, the large sample size gives us greater confidence and increases the 
likelihood of observing a true association between the candidate gene and our 
interested phenotype (Benjamin et al., 2012). Notably, this is one of the 
biggest single studies of candidate gene and economic behavior. This is 
perhaps not surprising since GWA studies based on chip technologies do not 
capture information regarding repeat regions such as the DRD4 exon III since 
linkage disequilibrium between SNPs and repeats is generally too weak to be 
informative1
Risk attitude are also reflected in personality traits, such as Impulsiveness, 
Excitement seeking and Novelty seeking, which are classically measured by 
self-report questionnaires in psychology. In contrast, behavioral economics 
employs incentivized laboratory games based on transparent paradigms and 
full disclosure of information to participants (
. 
see Ariely and Norton, 2007) to 
measure risk attitude. In our study, we empirically compared the robustness of 
the classical psychological approach and the behavioral economic strategy to 
detect genetic association in a large candidate gene investigation with the 
                                                 
1 As a comparison, the effect size in terms of R2 was around 2% in our study, twice as big as the usual 
effect size detected from the association between SNPs and economic behavior, usually less than 1% 
(Benjamin et al., 2012)  
 29 
 
further advantage of using a homogenous Han Chinese student population. We 
focused in particular on a common polymorphism, the DRD4 exon III VNTR 
that has been extensively studied in both personality genetics (Ebstein, 2006) 
and psychopathology (Wu et al., 2012). More importantly, this polymorphism 
suggested a clear prediction of direction (that 4R is more risk averse) for 
association with risk attitude. Indeed, albeit significant associations were 
found between risk preference measured by incentivized behavioral 
experiments and several personality traits measured by NEO and TCI-R 
questionnaires, and between the DRD4 exon III VNTR polymorphisms and 
risk preference, none of those personality traits was associated with the gene. 
These results suggest that incentivized laboratory based measures of risk 
preference, and perhaps other preferences elicited in incentivized games, could 
serve as more meaningful behavioral phenotype than questionnaire-based 
measures. These results are in accordance with the suggestion in several 
review articles (Bel, 2004, Ebstein, 2006, Ebstein et al., 2010, Winawer, 2006, 
Wojczynski and Tiwari, 2008). 
In summary, this study is to our knowledge the largest such investigation 
using incentivized laboratory-controlled behavioral economic tasks and 
computational method towards unraveling why individuals differ in risk 
attitude. The results are supportive of a role of dopamine neural pathways in 
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risk attitude and demonstrate how a neurogenetic strategy can be useful in 
identifying the underlying neuro-chemical architecture of decision making. 
Moreover, it adds to the rich literature mapping out a role of the DRD4 
receptor gene in risk taking consistent with studies dating back to 1996 
(Ebstein et al., 1996), but perhaps more importantly demonstrating the power 
of using laboratory based precisely measured decision making phenotypes. In 
the next study, we will switch from individual decision making to social 
decision making, and importantly, incorporate the role of cultural component 











ESSAY 2: Dopamine D4 Receptor Gene and Religious 
Affiliation Contribute to Altruistic Giving in the 




2.1  Introduction 
“Teach this triple truth to all: A generous heart, kind speech, and a life of 
service and compassion are the things which renew humanity” The Buddha 
Luke 14:13-14  "But when you give a reception, invite the poor, the 
crippled, the lame, the blind, and you will be blessed, since they do not have the 
means to repay you; for you will be repaid at the resurrection of the righteous." 
Contrary to the depiction in traditional economic theory of the Homo 
economicus as purely selfish, human beings are often altruistic and people are 
sometimes willing to help strangers at a considerable cost (sometimes even 
life itself) to themselves. Such altruistic behaviors are usually studied in 
experimental economics using the dictator games (Forsythe et al., 1994), in 
which two players are randomly matched and one of them (“the dictator”) 
decides how to divide a pie between them while the other player makes no 
decision. Consistent results have been observed across studies and cultures 
(Henrich et al., 2005) showing that people, contrary to the prediction of 
classical economic thinking, tend to give away a certain proportion of the pie 
to the others even if this would lead to a pure reduction on their own payoffs. 
In the second essay where we start to investigate other-regarding behavior, the 




A variety of evolutionary hypotheses have been invoked towards 
understanding the origins of altruism, including kin selection, group selection 
(Eldakar and Wilson, 2011) reciprocity, reputation building (see Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2003) and Nowak (2006) for review), altruistic punishment (Fehr 
and Gachter, 2002), and others. However, none of these explanations are likely 
to provide a completely satisfactory explanation for human altruism, 
especially towards strangers. Looking elsewhere for further explanations, 
cultural evolution, especially development of religious institutions (Henrich et 
al., 2010), embodying a fairer and more egalitarian concept of society, looms 
large. 
A unique feature of H. sapiens is that many of the skills essential for 
individual and group survival can be passed from one generation to the next. 
Such cultural evolution in humans is apparently an important mechanism that 
can help explain group selection (Bell et al., 2009) especially in the presence 
of other complementary processes, such as altruistic punishment (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2003) which ensures that group social norms are maintained. 
Moreover, evidence suggests that cultural and genetic forces are likely to 
jointly shape broad aspects of human behavior, a conceptualization referred to 
as gene-culture coevolution (Feldman and Laland, 1996). This theory provides 
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a further perspective for understanding the spread and maintenance of altruism 
in humans (Feldman et al., 1985) and indeed how culture partly shaped our 
very genome (Laland et al., 2010). 
Among the salient cultural factors that are likely important in 
understanding the widespread occurrence of prosocial traits in humans is 
religion. By providing educational environments for adherents to learn and 
communicate, religious affiliations can be considered as an important platform 
for cultural influx. Overall, there is considerable evidence from anthropology, 
sociology, experimental psychology, and experimental economics for religious 
prosociality (Henrich et al., 2010, Norenzayan and Shariff, 2008). For 
example, religious charitable giving is by far the largest and most widespread 
component of the billions of dollars in annual donations made by individuals, 
exceeding all other forms of individual charitable giving combined (Van Slyke 
and Brooks, 2005). In a study of 15 diverse populations it has been shown that 
both market integration and adherence to a world religion (Christianity or 
Islam) increased overall prosociality measured with the ultimatum, the dictator 
and third party punishment games (Henrich et al., 2010). A study by Shariff 
and Norenzayan (2007) showed that religious priming using the classical 
dictator game also enhanced altruism. On the other hand, evidences from twin 
studies (Koenig et al., 2007) show that religiousness is modestly correlated 
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with altruistic behavior, Furthermore, altruistic behavior shared most of its 
genetic influence, but only half of its shared environmental influence, with 
religiousness. Such quantitative genetic studies are complemented by 
molecular genetic approaches that inform us regarding specific gene 
contributions to these behaviors. 
A natural candidate gene that might contribute to human altruism is the 
DRD4 gene as already introduced in Essay 1. In addition to its direct 
association with reward process and risk taking behavior, this gene has also 
been studied for its role in modulating prosocial behavior. The first report of 
an association between DRD4 and measures of human altruism was observed 
in an Israeli sample using self-report questionnaires (Bachner-Melman et al., 
2005). This result has been replicated in a more recent study on a German 
ethnic group (Anacker et al., 2012). In both studies the absence of the less 
common exon III 7R was associated with higher altruism. However, other 
subsequent studies suggest that the effect of DRD4 on prosociality is 
contingent on environment (See Jiang et al. (2013) for review). For example, 
the presence of the DRD4 7R allele was associated with dissimilarities in the 
impact of parenting indexing temperamental sensation seeking (Sheese et al., 
2007). Sheese et al. (2007) showed that 7R children were more sensitive to 
parenting quality, with lower quality parenting associated with greater 
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sensation seeking. Moreover, children in the absence of the 7R allele were 
uninfluenced by parenting quality. Knafo et al (2011) also found that parenting 
environment related meaningfully to children’s prosocial behavior, but only 
among children carrying the DRD4 7R allele; in a Dutch study 
(Bakermans-Kranenburg and van Ijzendoorn, 2011), children with secure 
attachment representations donated more money but only if they had the 7R 
allele. In the Zhong et al. (2010) study, an association was observed between 
the DRD4 exon III VNTR and reciprocal fairness measured in an ultimatum 
game, and the interaction among this gene, season of birth, and gender was 
found to be highly significant. Sasaki et al. (2011) also find evidence for an 
association between the DRD4 exon III VNTR (the 2R and 7R) and 
prosociality but conditional upon religious priming. These findings suggest 
that the DRD4 gene and environmental factors moderate each other in 
cultivating prosocial behavior. As Belsky et al. (Belsky et al., 2007, Belsky et 
al., 2009) suggested, the exon III variants of the DRD4 gene seem to heighten 
susceptibility to a wide variety of environments, with supportive and adverse 
contexts promoting, respectively, positive and negative outcomes. Interestingly, 
as noted in a recent review by Pluess and Belsky (2013) “much less effort has 
been directed toward the investigation of endogenous factors associated with 
variability in response to positive influences”. 
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These previous investigations set the stage for the current study, which 
specifically focuses on the relationships between DRD4, religion and altruistic 
giving behavior. Importantly, we extended all of these findings viz., that 
altruistic giving in the dictator game was modulated by religious affiliation. 
Firstly, we switched from the situational priming method (Sasaki et al., 2011) 
to a more general context, and employed a self-reported questionnaire (King et 
al., 1995) to assess people's religious affiliation. Notably, we measured 
altruistic giving using a richly contoured, incentivized behavioral economic 
experiment, the Andreoni-Miller Dictator Game (A-M DG, Andreoni and 
Miller, 2002) that enabled us to identify three well defined types of sharing 
rules, which will be elaborated in the next section. 
This study was carried out on a large sample of 2,288 Han Chinese 
students recruited in Singapore who self identified as No Religion, 
Buddhist-Tao or Christian. Christians and Buddhist-Tao both adhere to the 
Golden Rule as the linchpin of human morality albeit with different 
rationalizations (Reilly, 2006). In the Christian tradition one is to see oneself 
and others as children of God, and hence to be treated equally as God would 
treat us. In the Buddhist tradition one is to treat oneself and others as suffering 
beings and to wish for the protection of suffering that a loving mother would 
provide to her suffering child. Such nuanced differences in concepts of 
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morality suggest that it worthwhile to compare these world religions (along 
with the No religion group). We therefore hypothesized that variation in 
specific religious affiliation is linked to individual differences in giving 
behavior. Finally, we suggest the notion based on a corollary to the differential 
susceptibility hypothesis (Ellis et al., 2011), so-called ‘vantage sensitivity’ 
(Manuck et al., 2011, Pluess and Belsky, 2013, Sweitzer et al., 2013), that 
carriers of the less common DRD4 exon III susceptibility alleles, non-4R/4R, 
would be those subjects most responsive to the positive environment provided 
by their religious and cultural milieu. Vantage sensitivity describes the concept 
that some individuals are more positively reactive to the environmental 
advantages to which they are exposed, and therefore our second hypothesis is 
that the association between religion and giving behavior is more pronounced 
among the carriers of susceptibility alleles. 
2.2  A-M Classification 
In the original A-M DG, each subject is given a menu of choices with different 
endowments m and prices p for payoffs, so that πs + 𝑝πo = 𝑚, where πs is 
the decision maker’s own monetary payoff and πo is the payoff of the other 
subject that has been randomly matched with the decision maker. Let 𝛱 be 
the set of possible payoffs of the game, a utility-maximizer s should choose 
the pair (πs,π0) ∈ 𝛱 that gives the highest level of utility with the form 
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Us = us(πs,π0). Using economic models, the authors found that most of the 
observed altruistic behavior is consistent with maximization of one of the 
three standard CES utility functions: perfect selfish: us(πs,π0) = πs, perfect 
substitutes: us(πs,π0) = πs + π0, or Leontief: us(πs,π0) = min {πs,π0}. A 
decision maker with perfect selfish utility function tries to maximize own 
payoff πs and does not concern about the other player’s payoff π0, as a 
consequence, these selfish people do not share any of their endowments with 
the other subject regardless of the price; in comparison, people with perfect 
substitutes maximizes the total payoff of both players, they give everything to 
the other player when the price of giving is lower than one, and keeps all 
endowments when the price is larger than one, in other words, they consider 
the overall efficiency in terms of the total size of the pie; finally, maximization 
of Leontief utility function leads to equal share of outcomes between the 
decision maker and the other subject, and thus is considered as the 
fairness/egalitarian motivation of sharing behavior. 
Our experiment involved five decision tasks (Appendix 2.B), for every 
task, there was an initial endowment for the dictator, and a factor R that 
determined the price of giving, i.e., the recipient would receive R dollars for 
every dollar sent by the dictator while the dictator keeps the remaining. 
Corresponding to the utility functions defined above, we examined our 
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subjects’ sharing behavior from three perspectives: 1) behavior guided by the 
perfect selfish utility is referred to as Hobbesian viz., Thomas Hobbes "war of 
all against all" (bellum omnium contra omnes), Hobbesian people are selfish 
and always keep all endowments to himself regardless of R; 2) the perfect 
substitute utility driven person will keep all endowments when R is smaller 
than 1, but give all to the recipient when R is larger than 1, such 
efficiency-driven behavior is called Coasian, viz., Coase Theorem ; 3) 
participants with Leontief utility will try to make an even split of the final 
payoff between himself and the recipient, we call this egalitarian motive 
Rawlsian, viz., John Rawles “A Theory of Justice” (Rawls, 1999), behavior. 
2.3  Methods 
The experiment was conducted with the same sample as in Essay 1, however, 
responses of subjects recruited in Beijing indicated a strikingly different 
understanding towards religion
2.3.1  Participants 
2  compared to subjects recruited in NUS. 
Consequently, in this study, we only focused on the subsample from NUS.3
                                                 
2 For example, a number of subjects in Beijing reported Marxism or Communism as their religion. 
 
Data from 2288 undergraduates were available (53.3% female; age: mean = 
20.98, SD = 1.48), and all of them were ethnic Han Chinese.  
3 This would naturally lead to a large reduction of statistical power to our analysis (around 20%), but the 
information is more reliable and less noisy than combining both cities. 
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Our experiment was adapted from the original A-M DG, including five tasks 
with varying initial endowments (from S$20 to S$40) and factor R (picked 
value from set {1/3 1/2 1 2 3}) across the five tasks. At the decision stage, all 
participants needed to decide independently how much to give to the recipient 
in each of the five tasks. While at the payment stage, participants were 
randomly matched as a pairs and the role of dictator and recipient were 
randomly assigned within each pair. One of the five decision tasks was 
randomly selected, and payments were made according to the dictator’s 
decision in this task (See Appendix 2.B for detailed experimental instruction). 
2.3.2  Behavioral experiment 
The Royal Free Interview Questionnaire (
2.3.3  Royal Free Interview for religious beliefs 
King et al., 2001) is an instrument 
designed to measure religious identification. We categorized the religious 
groups as follows: the No Religion category, the Christian category (including: 
Roman Catholic, Church of England/Anglican, Other Protestant, Evangelical 
Christian and Other Christian), the Buddhism and Taoism category, as well as 
the category of Other religions. 
Please refer to Essay 1 for details of genotyping procedure. 
2.3.4  Genotyping 
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In this study we applied the same genotype grouping scheme as shown in 
Essay 1. In particular we combined all non-4R/4R genotypes and compared it 
with the 4R/4R genotype group. 
2.3.5  Statistical analysis 
At the behavioral level, Giving Ratio (GR: the amount sent to the 
recipient divided by the initial endowment) in each of the five tasks was 
calculated for every subject. In addition, we followed A-M’s classification and 
identified three archetypical behaviors based on selfishness, efficiency and 
fairness motives (see Table S2.1). We calculated for each subject how much 
their actual decisions deviated from these archetypical behaviors. Specifically, 
in each decision task, we calculated the absolute difference between one’s 
actual GR and the predicted GR for each of the three archetypes, the average 
difference across the five tasks, ranged from 0 to 1, was then used to measure 
the participant’s deviation from this specific type of allocation. We then 
performed simple t-tests as well as controlled Tobit analyses to examine the 
effect of the gene and religious group as well as their interaction on these 
deviations. The statistical analysis was performed using STATA11. 
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2.4  Results 
In our sample of 2,288 participants, nearly half (46.2%) reported ‘no religious 
affiliation’, 28.6% reported themselves as Christians and 24.6% Buddhists or 
Taoists (B-T); finally, 14 participants reported one other less common (at least 
in Singapore) religious affiliations and thus have been excluded in all 
subsequent analyses due to the small sample size. 
2.4.1  Religious affiliation and DRD4 genotypes 
The DRD4 exon III VNTR was successfully genotyped in 2191 subjects. 
The allele and genotype distributions in our sample are shown in Figure S2.1. 
The 4R was the most common allele (75.58%), followed by the 2R allele 
(21.07%), whereas the other alleles were very uncommon (Figure S2.1.A). 
The distribution of alleles was in Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium (chi-2(26) = 
32.613; p = 0.250). Figure S2.1.B shows the distribution of genotypes, 58.06% 
of our subjects were of 4R/4R genotype, the rest carried at least one minor 
allele. This distribution was similar to that observed in other Eastern Asian 
populations (China, Korea and Japan). 
Table S2.2 shows the distribution of religious affiliations stratified by the 
DRD4 exon III VNTR genotypes. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests showed no 
difference in religious identification between the 4R/4R and non-4R/4R 
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groups (D = 0.002, p = 1.000), implying no self-identification of DRD4 exon 
III repeat number with one of the three religious groups (Christian, B-T or No 
Religion) among our participants.  
The average GR in the five decision-tasks varied from 0.19 to over 0.33, and 
increased as R became larger, implying that not all subjects were selfish, and 
people did consider overall efficiency when making decisions. Figure S2.2 
shows the distribution of the deviations from archetypical behaviors. Notably, 
461 (21.1%) of our subject strictly followed “pure” Hobbesian behavior, i.e. 
never shared anything with others. In comparison, fewer people were 
characterized by the archetypical Coasian (N = 174) or Rawlsian behaviors (N 
= 64). For most of our subjects, their sharing decision was shaped by more 
than one of these three archetypes. Further scrutinizing the cumulative 
distributions of the deviations shows that most subjects made decisions 
following Hobbesian (93.4%) and Rawlsian (87.9%) considerations by 
deviating less than half-way from the archetypical behaviors (Deviation < 0.5), 
whereas fewer subjects (71.0%) did so for the Coasian behavior. The mean 
value of Coasian deviation was 0.435, significantly exceeded the mean of 
Hobbesian deviation (mean = 0.257; p = 0.000) and Rawlsian deviation (mean 
= 0.351; p = 0.000) by two-sided t-tests. Altogether, these results indicated that 
2.4.2  A-M DG and sharing rules 
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self-interest and fairness were the major concerns for most of our subjects 
when deciding how much to share, whereas efficiency played a less important 
role. 
Average deviations for each religious category are demonstrated in Figure 
S2.3. As expected, the non-religious group exhibited the least deviation from 
pure Hobbesian and Coasian behavior and showed the greatest deviation from 
pure Rawlsian behavior. In other words the non-religious group appeared to be 
the most selfish and least concerned for equality. Building on these hypotheses, 
we conducted one-sided t-tests to compare the behavior of non-religious 
people with religious ones (combining Christian and B-T), and the mean 
values of non-religious group were significantly higher for the Rawlsian 
deviation (diff. = 0.014; p = 0.033), and marginally lower for the Hobbesian 
(diff. = -0.012; p = 0.073) and Coasian (diff. = -0.056; p = 0.060) deviation 
than in the religious groups. This analysis suggested that people who 
self-declared belonging to a religious group showed significantly more 
fairness concerns and thus tempered their pursuit of self-interest and overall 
efficiency. 




Next, we analyzed whether the DRD4 exon III genotype would moderate 
the effects of religious affiliation. Figure 2.1 shows the mean comparison of 
deviations from the archetypical behaviors within genotype groups. Evidently, 
among all non-4R/4R carriers, the Christian group was distinguished as least 
selfish, least efficient and most egalitarian. This observation was partially 
confirmed with two-sided t-tests conducted on Christian versus non-Christian 
groups: the mean values of Christian group were significantly higher for 
Hobbesian deviation (diff. = 0.034; p = 0.017) and lower for Rawlsian 
deviation (diff. = -0.032; p = 0.018) than non-Christian groups, but the 
difference was not significant for Coasian deviation (diff. = -0.018; p = 0.198). 
In contrast, there was no significant difference between the religious groups 
within the 4R/4R group (p > 0.100). 
Based on our first analysis, it was of interest to examine more closely the 
sharing behavior of the Christian group and particularly its interaction with 
DRD4. Accordingly, we conducted controlled Tobit regressions on the three 
types of behavior, with a dummy for being Christian, a dummy for carrying 





Figure 2.1 Mean comparison of deviations from archetypical behaviors 
between religious affiliations stratified by DRD4 exon III genotype. 
 
Panel (A) shows Hobbesian deviation, panel (B) shows Coasian deviation, and panel 
(C) shows Rawlsian deviation. The blue bars are No religion group, red bars are the 
Christian group, and green bars are the B-T group. Error bars are Standard Error of 
Mean.  
The results are reported in Table 2.1, columns (1) - (3) are models without any 
control variable, while columns (4) - (5) are models controlling for gender and 
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age. Before including control variables in the regression, we observed a 
significant main effect of the non-4R/4R genotype for Rawlsian behavior 
(coeff. = 0.020, p = 0.039), with non-4R/4R carriers deviating more from pure 
egalitarian behavior. The gene effect was not significant for the Coasian (coeff. 
= -0.018, p = 0.092) and Hobbesian behaviors (coeff. = -0.004, p = 0.721). 
There was no significant main effect of being Christian, but we did observe a 
significant interaction with non-4R/4R genotype for Rawlsian behavior (coeff. 
= -0.042, p = 0.020) and marginally so for Hobbesian (coeff. = 0.044, p = 
0.059). These results suggested that being Christian has differential effects on 
non-4R/4R carriers compared with 4R/4R carriers. Put another way, the 
presence of the non-4R/4R genotype appeared to make people more sensitive 
to the prosocial signals provided by adhering to the Christian faith. After 
controlling for age and gender, the findings were essentially the same despite a 
slight reduction in significance both for the main effect of DRD4 genotype and 
for the Christian x Non-4R/4R interaction. Bonferroni correction for multiple 
testing (across three phenotypes) implied that the interaction effect of gene 
and Christianity remains marginally significant for Rawlsian deviation (p = 
0.060). However, by construction, the three measures of sharing motive were 
not absolutely orthogonal, that is, deviating less from one dimension would 
lead to more deviation from the other two dimensions, and thus the Bonferroni 
correction method only provides the most conservative results.
  
 
Table 2.1 Tobit regression results for Christian x Non-4R/4Rinteraction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Hobbesian 1 Coasian 1 Rawlsian 1 Hobbesian 2 Coasian 2 Rawlsian 2 
Christian -0.002 -0.005 0.010 0.000 -0.004 0.008 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) 
DRD4 Non-4R/4R -0.004 -0.018* 0.020** -0.003 -0.016 0.017* 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) 
Christian * Non-4R/4R 0.044* 0.024 -0.042** 0.039* 0.021 -0.037** 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.018) (0.023) (0.020) (0.018) 
Female    0.009 0.055*** -0.041*** 
    (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) 
Age    -0.002 -0.004 0.005* 
    (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.229*** 0.436*** 0.341*** 0.272*** 0.481*** 0.258*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.083) (0.072) (0.064) 
Log likelihood -437.684 90.089 464.987 -420.782 91.707 477.491 
Left censored 450 169 64 434 169 60 
Observations 2152 2152 2152 2087 2087 2087 
Dependent variables are the deviations from archetypical behaviors. Marginal effects are reported, robust standard errors are in parentheses, * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Columns (1) – (3) are regressions without control variable, while columns (4) – (5) controls for gender and age. Results 
show the significant main effect of DRD4 in Rawlsian deviation, and a significant interaction effect between Christian and non-4R/4R genotype in 





Table 2.2 Tobit regressions split by DRD4 exon III genotype 
 4R/4R  Non-4R/4R 
 (1.A) (1.B) (1.C)  (2.A) (2.B) (2.C) 
 Hobbesian Coasian Rawlsian  Hobbesian Coasian Rawlsian 
Christian 0.000 -0.004 0.008  0.040** 0.016 -0.029** 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.012)  (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) 
Female 0.016 0.055*** -0.042***  0.002 0.056*** -0.040*** 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.012)  (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) 
Age -0.002 -0.003 0.005  -0.002 -0.005 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
Constant 0.262** 0.458*** 0.269***  0.274** 0.501*** 0.261*** 
 (0.103) (0.088) (0.082)  (0.138) (0.119) (0.099) 
Log likelihood -249.775 84.125 275.572  -170.806 8.901 201.950 
Left censored 258 93 37  176 76 23 
Dependent variables are the deviations from archetypical behaviors. Marginal effects are reported, robust standard errors are in 
parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Columns (1) – (3) are regressions for the 4R/4R subsample, while columns (4) – (5) are 





Finally, we conducted separate Tobit analyses to examine the effects of 
being Christian for 4R/4R and non-4R/4R subgroups, controlling for age and 
gender. As shown in Table 2.2, being Christian had no significant effect for 
sharing behavior in the 4R/4R subsample (columns (1) - (3)), whereas in the 
non-4R/4R subsample (columns (4) - (5)), being Christian corresponded to 
significantly higher Hobbesian deviation (coeff. = 0.040; p = 0.023) and lower 
Rawlsian deviation (coeff. = -0.029; p = 0.043), which confirmed our previous 
observation based on simple mean-comparison tests, i.e., only among 
non-4R/4R carriers was Christianity linked to higher fairness level and less 
selfishness. 
2.4  Discussion 
In this study, a robust incentivized behavioral economic paradigm was 
employed to examine altruistic giving behavior and its relationship to cultural 
milieu represented by religious affiliation. A Tobit analysis showed the 
importance of DRD4 genotype, Christianity and their interaction specifically 
in the motives of sharing (non-selfishness/fairness/efficiency). Compared with 
non-religious subjects, religious people concerned more about fairness and 
thus less about selfishness and efficiency. Moreover, there was an intriguing 
interaction between DRD4 genotype and the Christian religious group: 
Christianity was related to higher fairness level and lower selfishness level 
only among non-4R/4R carriers, while 4R/4R carriers were not responsive to 
the prosocial norms brought about by religion (Belsky and Pluess, 2009). 
 52 
 
 This relationship between DRD4 genotype and environment, herein as 
the cultural milieu surrounding being Christian, is consistent with one facet of 
the view put forth by Belsky and his colleagues (Belsky et al., 2007, Belsky et 
al., 2009, Pluess and Belsky, 2013) that the DRD4 exon III polymorphism is a 
plasticity gene that allows behavioral fine tuning to environmental signals — 
“for better and for worse”. Especially relevant to this view are two studies by 
Bakermans-Kranenburg and van Ijzendoorn (2011) and Knafo et al (2011). 
Both studies examined prosocial behavior in children and support the notion 
that DRD4 is a plasticity gene depending on environmental cues. The current 
investigation finds evidence for half of this hypothesis, sometimes termed 
vantage sensitivity (Manuck et al., 2011, Pluess and Belsky, 2013, Sweitzer et 
al., 2013). The role of the DRD4 polymorphism gives traction to the ‘bright 
side’ (Pluess and Belsky, 2013) of the differential susceptibility hypothesis. 
The non-4R/4R repeats confer an advantage viz., nudging carriers towards a 
more prosocial attitude, presumably energized by the positive cultural 
environment of Christianity and its historic tradition of charity and tithing. In 
the current study we showed that the non-4R/4R genotypes were more 
responsive to the norms of Christianity that promotes fairness concern and 
reduces selfish behavior, and therefore our results extend the concept of 
plasticity and sensitivity to also include cultural influences, often in historical 
flux, at the institutional level such as religion. 
Little is known how we acquire cultural norms such as generosity and 
sense of fairness and how the learning of such norms is impacted by genes. 
Recently Kim and his colleagues have suggested the notion that culture 
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comprises a considerable if not major source of environmental influences on 
Gene x Environmental interactions (Kim et al., 2010a, Kim et al., 2010b). 
Moreover, a specific role of DRD4 exon III in the acquisition of cultural 
norms has been shown in the studies of Kitayama et al (2014) (and see also 
Kitayama and UskulKitayama and Uskul (2011) for a fuller discussion of how 
culture is “embrained”). The current study in a large Han Chinese population 
shows the role of a major cultural institution, Christianity, in interacting with 
the DRD4 exon III repeat region in shaping human altruistic giving behavior. 
Hence, these current findings not only further reveal the role of the non-4R/4R 
repeats as a sensitive tuning fork to environmental signals, but also shows that 
such signals can resonate with the religious cultural milieu. 
Notably, in our study there was no influence of the DRD4 polymorphism 
on altruistic giving in the B-T group, despite that Buddhism and Taoism, no 
less than Christianity, in principle emphasizes charitable giving. The reason 
for this difference in the cultural impact of Christianity versus Buddhism and 
Taoism among Han Chinese undergraduates maybe explained by the different 
nature of the day to day observance of these two religions as well as the 
singular nature of the student population in comparison to the overall 
population in Singapore. Overall, in the Singapore population the percentage 
identifying as B-T is ~44%, no religion is 17% and Christian is 18.3% 
((Statistics, 2011) and see also (Pereira, 2005)). However, in our sample of 
university students the percentage in the no-religion group is ~50%, 29% 
Christian and only 25% B-T. These statistics for the student population are 
consistent with the observation that the younger generation of more educated 
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Chinese disavowed their parent’s traditional religion for the apparent 
advantage of Protestant Christianity. Interestingly, the converts stated that 
Christianity had not only a distinct and understandable set of texts and 
publications, but also an unmistakable organized structure, with regular 
services, ‘Sunday school’, Bible study classes, and fellowship programs 
(quoted in (Pereira, 2005)). Moreover, in Buddhism and Taoism religious 
obligation would often only involve attending a religious service on relatively 
infrequent designated holy days (BuddhaNet, 2008). Altogether, these 
observations suggest the notion that Buddhism and Taoism “market” religion 
apparently less effectively, and in a much different fashion than the Christian 
churches in Singapore. Naturally, future studies examining the effects of 
religiosity (e.g.: religious activity, strength of believes, etc.) would be 
necessary to verify this conjecture. 
The current results support the notion that religion by enhancing altruism 
becomes a force in group survival, and moreover, that religion drives human 
evolution by selecting for genes that under the religious umbrella contribute to 
altruistic choices. The DRD4 gene is one of the most polymorphic human 
genes and stands out as a plausible candidate in this regard. By implementing 
a molecular genetic strategy we showed that religion affects altruistic giving 
measured by the A-M DG but only in a specific group of subjects 
characterized by a certain genotype. Hence the value of a molecular genetic 
approach, in understanding human economic preferences (see Ebstein et al. 
(2010)) has been strengthened in this study. 
A main strength of the current study is firstly that we had a strong 
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biologically plausible hypothesis for the joint role of DRD4 and religious 
belief in shaping altruistic giving based on previous studies (Anacker et al., 
2012, Bachner-Melman et al., 2005, Bakermans-Kranenburg and van 
Ijzendoorn, 2011, Knafo et al., 2011, Sasaki et al., 2011, Zhong et al., 2010). 
Additionally, to minimize the problem of population stratification we recruited 
university students from a single well-characterized ethnic group, Han Chinese. 
To our knowledge this is also the largest study of Gene x Cultural interaction 
for this particular gene. The most important evidence for true and positive 
findings is of course, replication in an independent sample and we hope the 
current study will catalyze future large-scale studies towards unraveling the 
role of genes, and religion in shaping human altruism. 
While some economists have questioned the value of bringing in 
biological considerations, it is becoming increasingly apparent that both 
neuro-imaging (Camerer et al., 2004, Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004, 
Montague, 2007) and neurogenetic (Ebstein et al., 2010) approaches are 
informative towards understanding human decision making behavior. Our 
studies in Essay 1 and 2 have employed the tools of molecular genetics 
towards identifying the underlying neural pathways and specific genes 
contributing to both individual risk attitude as well as social preferences. Next, 
we will continue to study these preferences, and as a step further, their 












ESSAY 3: Fear or Fair: An Experimental Study on 




3.1  Introduction 
Competition is a commonly seen situation in daily life: students compete for a 
better college, workers compete for promotion, politicians compete for more 
votes, not to mention professional athletes who constantly compete for their 
career. Often time people face the decision of whether to be involved in such a 
competitive environment and the propensity to engage in a competition 
usually has large impact on one’s life plan, for instance, a high school student 
can fight for the most prestigious university through fierce competition with 
others, or to back up and enjoy the cushy life in a less popular but more 
relaxed college. For this reason, competitiveness in terms of self-selection into 
competition is an intriguing behavioral trait for economists to study. 
The nature of competition is inscribed with uncertain and uneven 
outcomes, and therefore people’s competitiveness might be strongly entangled 
with their attitude towards risk and equality. Indeed, experimental studies have 
shown that risk taking is positively correlated with competitiveness (e.g. 
Balafoutas et al., 2012, Bartling et al., 2009, Dreber et al., 2014, Niederle and 
Vesterlund, 2007), whereas egalitarian preferences reduce one’s willingness to 
self-select into a competition (Balafoutas et al., 2012, Bartling et al., 2009). 
Compared with competitions with positive reward incentives, from 
evolutionary point of view, competitions with penalties are more primitive for 
all living creatures including human beings: facing limited resources or the 
hunting of predators, lagging behind usually implies tremendous threats to life. 
Even in contemporary civilized society, penalties imposed on those who lost a 
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competition are also prevalent: as an example, it is not rare to see people 
compete with colleagues to avoid being fired at workplace. However, despite 
the prevalence of competitions in which losers are penalized while no extra 
reward for winners, the existing literature on competition behavior mainly 
focused on positive prize structures, especially among experimental studies. It 
is therefore of interest for us to start looking into competitions in the loss 
domain, namely, how do people respond to the threats of penalty and whether 
the attitude towards a loss-framed competition is linked to the same factors 
such as risk attitude and egalitarian preferences as it is in the gain setting? 
To answer these questions, the current study employed an experimental 
method to measure subjects’ competitiveness in two treatments with 
essentially identical prize structure, the difference between treatments only lay 
in the framing of prizes: in the gain treatment players could either choose to 
compete for a positive prize or to receive a piece-rate compensation; while in 
the loss treatment they chose between a tournament which penalizes the losers 
and a piece-rate penalty for their own mistakes. Following Bartling et al 
(2009), competitiveness in this study was implied via self-selecting into the 
competition. Egalitarian preferences were elicited using a distribution task, 
and subjects were classified into envy, compassion, or non-egalitarian types 
based on their responses in this task. Risk attitude towards gains, losses, and 
loss aversion were elicited using three lottery tasks with price list 
representation. 
Our results support the notion that envy is negatively related to 
competitiveness, but only in the gain domain. More interestingly, our second 
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result showed a reversed pattern of the association between risk attitude and 
competitiveness in gain and loss domains. Whereas subjects who were more 
risk averse in the gain lottery task were less willing to compete for a positive 
prize, risk aversion towards losses was significantly associated with higher 
propensity to compete in the loss domain. The former observation is consistent 
with the literature while the latter was contrary to our expectation, and we 
conjecture that this might be due to a cultural trait of “Kiasu” (afraid of losing 
out) among Singaporeans which drives risk seeking people walking away from 
a competition with penalty. 
The reminder of this essay is organized as follows: in section 3.2 we 
discuss the theoretical foundations and hypotheses; in section 3.3 we describe 
our experimental methods in detail; the experimental results are reported in 
section 3.4; and finally, we conclude the findings of the current study and 
discuss our conjectures regarding the observed patterns in section 3.5. 
3.2  Theory and hypotheses 
A simple model for inequity aversion proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (
3.2.1  Inequity aversion (F-S model) 
1999) 
comprises of two parts: the aversion towards lagging behind (envy) as well as 
towards leading ahead (compassion). Specifically, the following utility 
function has been proposed which is applicable in a two-player setting: ui = xi − α max�xj − xi; 0� −  β max�xi − xj; 0�,  i, j = 1,2       (1) 
Where xi and xj are payoffs of player i and j; for player i who concerns 
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the difference between his/her own payoff and player j’s payoff, parameter α 
governs the disutility raised from envy if player j earns more than his/herself 
does, while β determines the disutility caused by compassion if player j earns 
less. Furthermore, F-S model assumes that α > β, and 0 ≤ β < 1, implying that 
the disutility from envy looms larger than the disutility from compassion, and 
the net benefit from an increase of one’s own payoff is always positive. 
Based on F-S model, both envy and compassion shall be linked to a 
reduced propensity to self-select into competition which generates inequality 
between the opponents. Moreover, the relation between willingness to 
compete and envy shall be more evident than with compassion. In this study 
we would test these hypotheses under both gain and loss frameworks, since a 
gain frame is more likely to entail envy while a loss frame could elicit stronger 
compassion, we therefore expect to see a stronger correlation between 
competitiveness and envy in the gain treatment while a stronger correlation 
with compassion in the loss treatment. 
Prospect theory, proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (
3.2.2  Prospect theory 
1979) and later has 
been widely applied in behavioral economic studies, suggests that people 
perceive risks in gain and loss domains differently. Specifically, when facing 
moderate levels of uncertainty, people tend to be risk averse over gains while 
risk seeking over losses, characterized via a concave value function in the gain 
domain and convex value function in the loss domain. Moreover, they also 
claim that the disutility for losses looms larger than the utility from gains with 
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the same magnitude, and this has been referred to as “loss aversion”. As a 
consequence, the value function exhibits a kink at the reference point, usually 
the “status quo” (Figure 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1 Value function in Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) 
 
 
Building on this theory, it is conceivable that risk attitude for gains 
correlates with the willingness to take part in a gain-framed competition, while 
risk attitude for losses shall be linked to competitiveness in a loss-framed one. 
According to F-S inequity aversion model, our first set of hypotheses is to test 
the association between inequity aversion subtypes (compassion and envy) 
and competitiveness in gain and loss treatments. 
3.2.3  Hypotheses 
H(1): In general, both envy and compassion are negatively associated with 
competitiveness. 
H(2): In the gain domain, envy has a stronger association with 
competitiveness than compassion does. 
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H(3): In the loss domain compassion has a stronger association with 
competitiveness than envy does. 
The second set of hypotheses is built upon the implication of Prospect 
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and tests how risk attitude over gains 
and losses relates to competitiveness in gain and loss frames. 
H(4): Risk aversion towards gains is negatively correlated with self-selecting 
into competitions with positive prize. 
H(5): Risk aversion towards losses is negatively correlated with 
self-selecting into competitions with penalties. 
3.3  Methods 
108 Han Chinese undergraduates from various majors in National University 
of Singapore participated in our experiments in October and November, 2013. 
Among them 75 were females, the mean age of our subjects was 21.5 years 
(SD = 1.6y). The summary statistics of the demographics are summarized in 
Table S3.1. The study was approved by the Institution Review Board of 
National University of Singapore and consent forms were signed prior to 
experiment. Subjects were randomly assigned into gain and loss treatments in 
4 sessions, which resulted in 55 subjects in the two gain sessions and 53 in the 
two loss sessions (
3.3.1  Participants 
Table 3.1). The payoffs in the experiments were 
denominated in Experimental Currency Unit (ECU), with a pre-defined 
exchange rate of 1ECU = S$0.4. The average payment for participating in this 
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experiment was S$35 per person. Sessions lasted for around 60 minutes. The 
experiments were programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree 3.3.11 
(Fischbacher, 2007) in a computer lab at NUS. 
Table 3. 1 Number of participants in each session 
 Session Number of participants Total 
Gain 
Gain 1 31 
55 
Gain 2 24 
Loss 
Loss 1 30 
53 
Loss 2 23 
Total   108 
 
This study mainly followed the procedure of 
3.3.2  Procedure 
Bartling et al. (2009) with a few 
modifications in game design4
Dohmen et al., 
2009
. The experiment consisted of three parts. 
Experiment 1 was a distribution task used to elicit inequity aversion. 
Experiment 2 involves a real-effort task, in which subjects were asked to 
choose between the piece rate and the tournament payment schemes, so that 
competitiveness was implied via self-selecting into competition. The last 
experiment used three lottery tasks with the price list design (
) to measure risk attitude and loss aversion. Finally, after seeing their 
payment calculation based on these incentivized behavioral tasks, subjects 
were given a short post-experimental questionnaire, in which demographic 
information was gathered. The details of these tasks are elaborated below and 
the experimental instructions are available in Appendix 3.B. 
                                                 
4 As in Bartling et al. (2009), we did not randomize the order of the three experiments, and this might 
entail an order effect which could not be detected with current design. However, our results were 
consistent with other studies which used similar tasks but with a different order (Balafoutas et al., 2012), 
and therefore we conjecture that the order effect, if any, shall not be altering the main results. 
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The first experiment was adapted from 
3.3.3  Experiment 1: Inequity aversion 
Bartling et al. (2009); in this 
experiment, subjects were exposed to six distribution games, in which they 
were randomly matched as pairs with a decision maker (DM) and a passive 
player (PP). Before knowing their roles, subjects were asked to think as the 
DM and choose between an equal and an unequal allocation of payoffs 
between him/herself and the PP. To rule out a purely selfish decision in our 
later classification of inequity aversion types, the option of “indifferent 
between the equal and unequal payoffs” was also available. The tasks are 
displayed in Table 3.2, whereas option B was always the equal outcome for 
both players (both would receive 20 ECU), option A were different 
combinations of unequal outcomes across the six tasks. Specifically, the first 
three tasks were disadvantageous to the DM, in which the PP would always 
receive 24 ECU, more than the DM (from 15 to 22 ECU, arranged in an 
ascending manner across the three tasks); while the last three tasks were 
advantageous to the DM in which his/her payoffs ranged from 18 to 25 ECU 
(arranged in an ascending manner across the three tasks), more than the PP, 
who would always receive 16 ECU in Option A. In the real experiment, 
subjects did not see the table; instead, the tasks were demonstrated separately 
in six pages (only one task on each page). 
Table 3.2 Distribution tasks 
Option A Option B Option C Your Choice 
You receive: 15 ECU  
The passive player receives: 24 ECU  
You receive: 20 ECU  
The passive player receives: 20 ECU  
Indifferent between 
A and B A  B  C  
You receive: 20 ECU  
The passive player receives: 24 ECU  
You receive: 20 ECU  
The passive player receives: 20 ECU  
Indifferent between 
A and B A  B  C  
You receive: 22 ECU  
The passive player receives: 24 ECU  
You receive: 20 ECU  
The passive player receives: 20 ECU  
Indifferent between 
A and B A  B  C  
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You receive: 18 ECU  
The passive player receives: 16 ECU  
You receive: 20 ECU 
The passive player receives: 20 ECU 
Indifferent between 
A and B A  B  C  
You receive: 20 ECU  
The passive player receives: 16 ECU  
You receive: 20 ECU 
The passive player receives: 20 ECU 
Indifferent between 
A and B A  B  C  
You receive: 25 ECU  
The passive player receives: 16 ECU  
You receive: 20 ECU  
The passive player receives: 20 ECU 
Indifferent between 
A and B A  B  C  
 
Based on subjects’ responses in Experiment 1, we were able to classify 
them into three types as summarized in Table 3. 3. First, the compassion type 
included the strongly compassionate people who chose equal allocation in the 
advantageous block without multiple switching in the other block (upper block, 
row 1 - 4); it also contained the weakly compassionate ones who chose 
unequal allocation only in the last row of both blocks (where the subjects will 
suffer a cost to choose the equal allocation option) but equal allocation in 
other rows of the advantageous block without multiple switching in the 
disadvantageous block (upper block, row 5 - 6). The second type was the envy 
type, as opposed to the compassion type, it contained the strongly envious 
people who chose equal allocation in the disadvantage block without multiple 
switching in the advantageous block (lower block, row 1 - 4), as well as the 
weakly envious ones who chose unequal options only in the last raw, but 
perused equality in disadvantageous block and did not show multiple 
switching in the advantageous block (lower block, row 5 - 6). These two 
categories were not entirely exclusive to each other, in other words, there 
existed some individuals who did not like inequality in both advantageous and 
disadvantageous circumstances, and therefore were present in both categories. 
Finally, the remaining subjects who did not belong to either of these two types 
were considered as the non-egalitarian type. 
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Table 3. 3 Classification of inequity aversion types 

















Classifications of compassion and envy types are presented. Choices column 
summarizes choice patterns across the six distribution tasks to be classified under 
each type, the first three numbers indicate choices made in the disadvantageous block 
and the last three numbers indicate choices made in the advantageous block, all 
shown in the same order as the tasks; A = Option A (choosing the unequal allocation), 
B = Option B (choosing the equal allocation). Freq. column shows the number of 
participants who showed such pattern. The last column shows the total number of 
participants who belonged to the corresponding type. 
In the second experiment, we used a two-phase real-effort task to measure 
competitiveness based on choices of payment schemes. The first phase was a 
practice phase, during which subjects were given three minutes to finish 16 
questions with 8 trivia questions adopted from (www.paulsquiz.com) and 8 
summation tasks to add up five 3-digit numbers randomly generated by 
computer (examples of the tasks are shown in the Experimental Instructions in 
Appendix 3.B)
3.3.4  Experiment 2: Competitiveness 
5
                                                 
5It’s been suggested that competitiveness may be affected by the nature of tasks (e.g. Dreber et al., 2014), 
so we used two kinds of tasks in order to balance the effects of the task type. 
 . The system was programmed to leave the practice phase 
automatically when the three minutes’ time runs up, and subjects were then 
asked to estimate how many questions they have answered correctly as well as 
their own ranks of performances in the practice phase among all participants in 
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the same session. These estimations were then used to assess subjects’ 
overconfidence levels and subjective winning probabilities, which were to be 
controlled in our later analysis. In particular, ability was calculated as the ratio 
of correct answers in the practice phase; secondly, overconfidence in their own 
ability was indexed as the difference between the guessed number of correct 
answers and actual correct answers divided by the total number of questions in 
the practice phase; finally, we calculated subjects’ subjective beliefs of their 
own winning probability as (N - Guessed Rank) / (N - 1), where N was the 
number of subjects in the same session6
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007
. Although these variables were all 
induced from the practice phase, they were likely to influence our subjects’ 
decisions on whether to compete in the real effort phase: whereas ability and 
overconfidence are stable traits and are found to be linked to competitiveness 
in other studies ( ), subjective winning 
probability was the only information one could rely on to judge their risk of 
winning when decisions were made (no feedback on actual performance was 
provided until the end of the experiment). 
Next, before being directed to the real-effort phase, subjects were asked 
to choose between the piece-rate and the tournament payment schemes. This 
was the crucial step because gain and loss treatments were distinguished 
through different frames in the description of the payment schemes: in the gain 
treatment, subjects were informed that they would receive 1 ECU for every 
correct answer they made in the real-effort task if the piece-rate scheme was 
                                                 
6 The numerator indicates the number of people one believes ranked lower than him/herself; and the 
denominator is the number of other subjects in the same session. This formula implies the subject 
probability of someone ranks higher than a randomly chosen opponent in the same session. We use this 
probability as a proxy for subjective winning probability in the next phase. 
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chosen; as a comparison, if one chose tournament scheme, he/she would be 
randomly matched with another player who also chose tournament, and the 
payment would be determined by the relative performances of both players, in 
particular, the winner would be awarded a winning prize of 25 ECU in 
addition to the tournament baseline payment of 5 ECU, while the loser could 
only receive the baseline payment. In contrast, under the loss frame, by 
choosing piece-rate scheme a subject could receive 20 ECU as baseline 
payment, however, every wrong answer or unanswered question would incur 1 
ECU penalty to be deducted from it; in comparison, the alternative tournament 
payment provided 30 ECU baseline payment, if one wins, he/she could keep 
the entire baseline payment; however, if one loses, a penalty of 25 ECU would 
be deducted (see Appendix 3.B for detailed instructions). After making the 
choices for payment schemes, subjects were directed to the 5-min real-effort 
phase, during which they needed to solve 20 questions including 10 trivia 
questions and 10 summation tasks with similar difficulty to questions in the 
practice phase. 
In this part of experiment, we used three lottery tasks with the price list 
representation (
3.3.5  Experiment 3: Risk attitude 
Dohmen et al., 2009) to measure subjects’ risk attitude towards 
losses and gains as well as loss aversion. Each task contained ten rows of 
binary choices between an even-chance lottery and a sure amount of payment. 
Specifically, the first task involved only non-negative payoffs: the lottery was 
comprised of 50% chance of receiving 30 ECU and 50% chance of receiving 
nothing, while the sure amount ranged from 7.5 to 17.5 ECU and was arranged 
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in an ascending manner across the ten rows. The number of risky options (NR) 
being chosen in the ten decisions was used as our primary indicator of the 
participant’s risk attitude towards gains, as a larger proportion would indicate 
higher tolerance to risk in gains. Similarly, we used a loss lottery with 50% 
chance of losing 15 ECU and 50% of losing zero versus a sure loss ranging 
from 8 ECU to 6.4 ECU in the second task to measure risk attitude towards 
losses, a higher NR would indicate more risk seeking in the loss domain. 
Finally, the last task involved a mixed lottery with 50% chance of receiving 30 
ECU and 50% chance of losing 16 ECU, while the sure payoff ranged from a 
loss of 3 ECU to a gain of 10 ECU. This task could be used to measure loss 
aversion with higher NR indicating lower degree of loss aversion. A 
commonly seen alternative to measure risk attitude with the price list design is 
the switching point (SP) from the risky option to the safe option which 
coincides with the NR measurement when there is no preference reversal; 
however, in the cases of preference reversal, the SP measurement is more 
prudent and considers these multiple-switching or reversed switching 
responses as missing data. Nevertheless, since SP has a stronger restriction for 
the pattern of responses, it provides a better implication for risk attitude 
classification, namely, whether one is risk seeking, risk neutral, or risk averse 




3.4  Results 
As shown in 
3.4.1  Summary statistics 
Table 3. 4, among the 108 subjects, 39 subjects were classified as 
compassion type; 50 were envy type, and 42 of them belonged to the 
non-egalitarian type. Noted that in this classification, 20 subjects were both 
compassion and envy types, namely, they were averse to inequity no matter 
being ahead or behind. The distributions of NR and SP in the three lottery 
tasks are displayed in Figure S3.1. Based on SP, consistent with the 
predictions of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), most subjects 
were risk averse for gains (77.23%) but risk seeking for losses (59.80%), and 
showed loss aversion (67.65%) in mixed lottery. Spearman’s rank correlation 
tests showed significant positive correlations between responses to the gain 
lottery and mixed lottery (NR: r = 0.360, p = 0.000; SP: r = 0.332, p = 0.006), 
however, no significant association was observed between responses in loss 
lottery and the other two lottery tasks (NR: gain vs loss: r = -0.026, p = 0.792; 
loss vs mixed: r = -0.017, p = 0.865; SP: gain vs loss: r = -0.044, p = 0.668; 
loss vs mixed: r = -0.028, p = 0.824). The proportion of tournament entry is 
summarized in Table 3. 4. Overall, there are 57 (52.78%) subjects choosing 
the tournament payment scheme, this proportion was higher in the gain 
(58.49%) than in the loss treatment (47.27%), and was higher in male (60.61%) 
than in female subgroup (49.33%), however, the differences were not 
statistically significant (Mann-Whitney rank sum test, treatment: p = 0.245; 




Table 3. 4 Proportion of choosing tournament payment scheme 
 
Frequency  Percent (%) p-value  (Mann-Whitney) 
Gain 31 58.49 0.245  Loss 26 47.27 
Female 37 49.33 
0.282 Male  20 60.61 
Combined 57 52.78   
The summary statistics of ability, overconfidence and beliefs are reported 
in Table S3.2. For both males and females, the average ratio of correct answers 
in the practice phase was around 0.26 (around 4 questions out of 16 were 
answered correctly)7, and this level corresponded to a piece-rate payment of 
about 5 ECU for the real-effort task with 20 questions, which was the lower 
bound of tournament payment for the same task. In other words, if our 
subjects had estimated their ability correctly, choosing the tournament 
payment scheme was expected to weakly dominate the piece-rate payment 
scheme on average, and therefore the average tournament entry should be 
higher than 50%8
                                                 
7 On average (in practice) math ability = 0.314 (male: 0.330, female: 0.307, gender difference p = 0.732, 
by Mann-Whitney test); trivia ability = 0.212(male: 0.201, female: 0.217, gender difference p = 0.794). 
 if the entry decisions were not affected by other factors. We 
then examined our subjects’ overconfidence on their own ability as the number 
of guessed excess correct answer (i.e.: guessed correct answer – actual correct 
answer) divided by the total number of questions. The overconfidence levels 
were 0.008 for female and 0.015 for males, and both were not significantly 
different from zero (t-test, Female: p = 0.551; Male: p = 0. 470), implying that 
our subjects were able to give a precise estimation on their own past 
performance in terms of ratio of correct answers. Finally, for the tournament 
entry decision, it also matters how likely they believed themselves could win 
8 In other words, the proportion of tournament entry shall be higher than out of random choices because 
the expected payoff is higher than that from the piece-rate payment. 
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in a tournament with a randomly matched opponent, and therefore we 
examined the subjective winning probability as specified in the Methods 
section. The average subjective winning probability was 0.367 among females 
while 0.493 among males. Whereas no significant difference in ability and 
overconfidence between gender was observed, males were significantly more 
confident in their winning probabilities (Mann-Whitney rank sum test, p = 
0.023). 
3.4.2  Result 1 (Inequity aversion)
lower probability to compete, but only when the prize structure was framed 
as gains; whereas Compassion as not associated with competitiveness in either 
treatment. 
: Envy was significantly associated 
with 
The first observation of our analysis is that, as illustrated in Figure 3.2, 
both envy (red line) and compassion (blue line) types showed lower 
proportion of tournament entry compared to the non-egalitarian subjects 
(green line) regardless of the treatment. The proportion of tournament entry in 
the loss treatment was lower than in the gain treatment for all types. 
Specifically, in the gain treatment, whereas 65% non-egalitarian subjects 
chose tournament, only 52% of the envy type did so, and the proportion in the 
compassion group lay in the middle (56%), implying that envy had a stronger 
effect than compassion did in the gain treatment. In contrast, the differences in 
the loss treatment were less evident. Nevertheless, the non-egalitarian group 
still showed slightly higher proportion of tournament entry (50%) than the 
envy (48%) and compassion (48%) types. These results partially supported 
hypotheses H(1) - (3) that inequity aversion is negatively related to 
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competitiveness, with envy being more salient than compassion in the gain 
domain but not in the loss domain, however, we did not observe a stronger 
effect of compassion than envy in the loss domain. 
Figure 3. 2 Proportions of tournament entry across inequality aversion types 
 
Gain and loss treatments are indicated in x-axis, and the proportion of subjects 
choosing tournament payment scheme is shown in the y-axis. Compassion type is 
shown in blue, envy type is in red and the rest is shown in green. All three types have 
higher tournament entry rate in gain treatment than in loss, and non-egalitarian group 
has higher tournament entry rate than compassion and envy types in both treatments. 
 
Statistical examinations for H(1) - (3) were carried out via Probit 
regressions with tournament entry decision (0 = Piece Rate, 1 = Tournament) 
as dependent variable and inequity aversion type dummies (compassion and 
envy)9, loss treatment dummy10
 
, as well as their interactions as explanatory 
variables. 
Table 3. 5 summarizes the regression results, specifically, columns (1) - 
(3) are the results with pooled data, and columns (4) - (5) are results for gain 
and loss treatments, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in all 
                                                 
9 The non-egalitarian type is the baseline group for comparison. 



























We first tested the influences of compassion and envy in column (1) 
without control variables; in column (2), we controlled the treatment effect 
through a dummy variable for the loss treatment. Moreover, we also 
considered the interactions between the loss treatment and inequity aversion 
types. No significance of either compassion or envy was observed in both 
models. Interestingly, when we controlled for demographics (female, age, 
number of siblings, and family income level), ability and beliefs (ability, 
overconfidence and belief of winning probability), as well as risk preferences 
(NR in gain, loss, and mixed lottery tasks) in column (3), the interaction term 
of Loss*Envy becomes significant at 5% level, implying differentiated 
influences of envy under gain and loss frames, and thus H(1) was not fully 
supported. 
To further test hypotheses H(2) and H(3), we examined the influences of 
compassion and envy in gain and loss treatments separately in column (4) and 
(5). As expected, in the gain treatment, envy type showed 34.3 percent (p = 
0.044) lower probability of choosing tournament compared to non-egalitarian 
people and compassion type showed 19 percent lower probability than the 
non-egalitarian group, but the difference was not statistically significant (p = 
0.331). In contrast, both types did not show significant association with 
competitiveness (Compassion: p = 0.346; Envy: p = 0.286) in the loss 
treatment. 
Overall, these results suggested that the negative association between 
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envy and competitiveness was present only in gain framed environment, 
whereas compassion did not show strong association with competitiveness. 
Therefore our first set of hypotheses was only partially supported. 
Table 3. 5 Effect of inequity aversion on competitiveness (Probit) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Pool1 Pool2 Pool3 Gain Loss 
Compassion -0.026 0.009 -0.122 -0.190 0.157 
 (0.101) (0.120) (0.133) (0.194) (0.165) 
Envy -0.053 -0.114 -0.216 -0.343** 0.171 
 (0.097) (0.139) (0.147) (0.159) (0.158) 
Loss  -0.132 0.504   
  (0.159) (0.285)   
Loss*Compassion  -0.092 0.270   
  (0.225) (0.240)   
Loss*Envy  0.092 0.488**   
  (0.210) (0.181)   
Demographics    + + + 
Ability & Beliefs  
  + + + 
Risk    + + + 
Loss*Risk  
  +   
Log likelihood -74.52 -73.57 -55.84 -25.81 -25.32 
Observations 108 108 108 53 55 
Marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses;*p < 0.10, **p < 
0.05, ***p < 0.01; Dependent variable is Tournament dummy: 1= chose Tournament 
payment scheme for the real-effort phase, 0 = otherwise. Compassion: 1 = being 
compassion type, 0 = otherwise. Envy: 1 = being envy type, 0 = otherwise. Loss: 1 = 
loss treatment, 0 = gain treatment. Demographics include: female, age, number of 
siblings, and family income level; Beliefs include: ability, overconfidence and 
subjective winning probability; Risk include: number of risky choices in gain, loss, and 
mixed lottery tasks. 
3.4.3  Result 2 (Risk attitude)
Next, we focused on the association between risk attitude and 
competitiveness and tested the second set of hypotheses H(4) - (5). The Probit 
regression results are summarized in 
: Risk affinity for gains was positively 
associated with people’s propensity to compete, but only when the prize 
structure was framed as gains; while risk affinity for losses was negatively 
associated with people’s propensity to compete, but only when the prize 
structure was framed as losses. 
Table 3.6. Column (1) shows a significant 
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negative association between the number of risky choices in loss lotteries 
(NR_Loss) and the probability of choosing tournament payment scheme in the 
real-effort task (p = 0.002), on average, one additional risky choice being 
chosen corresponds to a decrease in tournament entry probability by 5.1 
percent. After we included the treatment dummy and its interaction terms with 
the risk attitude variables in column (2), the significance of NR_Loss 
disappeared as it now represents the effects in the baseline group, i.e. the gain 
treatment; meanwhile we observed a significant positive main effect of loss 
treatment (p = 0.039) and significant negative interaction effects between loss 
dummy and risk attitude (Loss*NR_gain: p = 0.069; Loss*NR_loss: p = 
0.005). The coefficient of loss dummy suggested that: among those who did 
not choose any risky choices in all three tasks (the baseline group), people in 
loss treatment were 61.9 percent more likely to choose tournament scheme. 
Moreover the interaction terms showed that one additional risky choice in the 
gain lottery was associated with 7.6 percent lower probability of choosing 
tournament in the loss treatment than in the gain treatment, and one additional 
risky choice in the loss lottery was associated with 11.2 percent lower 
probability of tournament entry in the loss treatment, suggesting that the 
association between risk attitude and competitiveness was differentiated 
between gain and loss treatments. In column (3), we further controlled for 
demographics, ability and beliefs, as well as inequity aversion and its 
interaction terms, we found that the positive correlation between risk affinity 
over gains and competitiveness now became significant with a marginal effect 
of 6.4 percent (p = 0.049), although the loss dummy was no longer significant 
(p = 0.130), its interactions with risk taking for gains and losses became more 
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significant (Loss*Risk_gain: p = 0.023; Loss*Risk_loss: p = 0.004) and the 
marginal effects enlarged to 9.8 percent and 12 percent decrease of tournament 
entry, respectively. 
Since our hypotheses H(4) and H(5) were focusing on gain and loss 
treatments respectively, we thus conducted separate analyses for these two 
treatments. Columns (4) and (5) demonstrate a domain-specific pattern of 
association between risk attitude and competitiveness: whereas risk affinity for 
gains was significantly associated with higher competitiveness only in gain 
framed tournament (p = 0.016) with a marginal effect of 8.6 percent, risk 
affinity for losses was associated with a significantly lower probability to 
choose tournament only in loss treatment (p = 0.000), with a marginal effect of 
13.3 percent. In other words, competitiveness in gains and losses was shown 
to be highly correlated with risk attitude in the corresponding domains but not 
cross domains. Specifically, as reported in previous studies (Balafoutas et al., 
2012, Bartling et al., 2009, Dreber et al., 2014), those who are more risk 
averse for gains are less likely to enter a tournament with a positive prize for 
the winner; in contrast, risk attitude for losses showed a reversed association 
with competitiveness, it was those who are more risk seeking for losses that 
were less likely to compete when there is a penalty to the loser. This 
interesting pattern was in support of our hypothesis H(4) but in contrary to 
H(5) which expect a positive correlation between risk taking and 
competitiveness in their corresponding domains. 
Table 3. 6 Effect of risk attitude on competitiveness (Probit) 
Probit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Tournament  Pooled 1 Pooled 2 Pooled 3 Gain Loss 
NR_Gain 0.018 0.047 0.064** 0.086** -0.041 
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   (0.021) (0.031) (0.033) (0.034) (0.028) 
NR_Loss -0.051*** -0.006 -0.009 -0.019 -0.133*** 
   (0.016) (0.021) (0.024) (0.030) (0.034) 
NR_Mixed 0.006 -0.000 0.001 0.003 0.043 
   (0.019) (0.027) (0.028) (0.033) (0.030) 
Loss   0.619** 0.504   
    (0.230) (0.285)   
Loss*NR_Gain  -0.076* -0.098**   
    (0.042) (0.043)   
Loss*NR_Loss  -0.112*** -0.120***   
    (0.039) (0.041)   
Loss*NR_Mixed  0.043 0.027   
    (0.037) (0.040)   
Demographics    + + + Ability & Beliefs  
  + + + 
Inequity aversion    + + + 
Loss*Inequity aversion   +   
Log likelihood  -68.81 -62.27 -55.84 -25.81 -25.32 
Observations  108 108 108 53 55 
Marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.10, **p < 
0.05, ***p < 0.01; Dependent variable is Tournament dummy: 1 = chose Tournament 
payment scheme for the real-effort phase, 0 = otherwise. NR_Gain, NR_Loss, and 
NR_mixed are proportions of risky choices in the gain, loss, and mixed lottery tasks, 
respectively, a higher number indicates higher risk affinity. Loss: 1 = loss treatment, 0 
= gain treatment. Demographics include: female, age, number of siblings, and family 
income level; Beliefs include: ability, overconfidence and subjective winning 
probability; Inequality aversion include: compassion and envy. 
3.4.4  Robustness check
As a robustness check, we used the more restrictive yet more meaningful 
measure of SP for risk attitude and show the results in 
: with switching points as risk attitude indicator and 
controlling for session specific factors. 
Table 3.7. Although the 
number of observation has been largely reduced (from 108 to 62 in the pooled 
regression) due to missing data in the mixed lottery task, there was still a 
highly significant association between risk attitude for losses and 
competitiveness in the pooled sample: the marginal effect was 8.8 percent (p = 
0.001) reduction of tournament entry for a higher switching point in loss 
lottery before entering treatment and interaction terms as shown in column (1); 
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this effect has been absorbed by the interaction term of Loss*SP_Loss in 
column (2), which showed that one additional risky choice before switching in 
the loss lottery were associated with 24.8 percent lower probability of 
tournament entry in the loss treatment than in the gain treatment (p = 0.002). 
Moreover, a marginal significance of the loss dummy implied that: among 
those who did not choose any risky choices in all three tasks, people in loss 
treatment were 75.5 percent more likely to choose tournament scheme. After 
controlling for demographics, ability and beliefs, as well as inequity aversion 
and its interaction terms in column (3), the marginal effect of loss dummy and 
its interaction with loss lottery were strengthened to 95.7 percent (p = 0.004) 
and minus 35.4 percent (p = 0.004) respectively. In addition, the interaction 
between gain lottery and the loss dummy became significant with a marginal 
effect of minus18.9 percent (p = 0.006). Moreover, we also observed a positive 
interaction effect of loss aversion and the treatment: an additional risky choice 
before switching in the mixed lottery is linked to 22.2 percent more 
tournament entries in the loss treatment than in the gain treatment (p = 0.049), 
intuitively, a higher tolerance to losses should imply an larger increase in 
tournament entry under the loss frame than under the gain frame. 
In columns (4) and (5) we conducted separate analyses for both 
treatments11
                                                 
11Risk attitude in mixed lottery is not included in the regressions due to the large number of missing 
values. 
. Consistent with previous findings, we found that risk aversion 
over gains were linked to lower willingness to compete in the gain treatment 
but not in the loss treatment, with one larger switching point corresponding to 
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10.2 percent higher probability of entering the gain-framed tournament (p = 
0.006). In contrast, competitiveness in the loss treatment was only associated 
with the risk attitude for losses (p = 0.000), with one more risky choice before 
switching corresponding to 13.9 percent lower probability of entering the 
loss-framed tournament. In other words, more risk seeking people were less 
willing to compete under loss frame. Both results were stronger than our 
primary findings, suggesting a strong and robust association between risk 
attitude and competitiveness in respective domains. 
Table 3. 7 Using switching points as risk attitude indicator (Probit) 
Probit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Tournament Pooled 1 Pooled 2 Pooled 3 Gain Loss 
SP_Gain 0.038 0.056 0.066 0.102*** -0.023 
  (0.029) (0.047) (0.047) (0.036) (0.028) 
SP_Loss -0.088*** -0.030 -0.025 0.004 -0.139*** 
  (0.026) (0.029) (0.033) (0.033) (0.039) 
SP_Mixed 0.000 -0.008 0.005   
  (0.023) (0.031) (0.031)   
Loss  0.755* 0.957***   
   (0.242) (0.069)   
Loss*SP_Gain  0.001 -0.189***   
   (0.070) (0.070)   
Loss*SP_Loss  -0.248*** -0.354***   
   (0.075) (0.091)   
Loss*SP_Mixed  0.094 0.222**   
    (0.059) (0.102)   
Demographics    + + + Ability & Beliefs    + + + Inequity aversion    + + + Loss*Inequity aversion    +   
Log likelihood  -34.33 -28.01 -20.12 -21.89 -20.86 
Observations  62 62 62 47 49 
Marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses;*p < 0.10, **p < 
0.05, ***p < 0.01; Dependent variable is Tournament dummy: 1 = chose Tournament 
payment scheme for the real-effort phase, 0 = otherwise. Risk in gains, losses, and 
mixed lotteries are the switching points in these tasks, respectively, a higher number 
indicates higher risk affinity. Loss: 1 = loss treatment, 0 = gain treatment. 
Demographics include: female, age, number of siblings, and family income level; 
Beliefs include: ability, overconfidence and subjective winning probability. Inequality 
aversion include: compassion and envy. 
Finally, we also concerned that the unbalanced proportion of male and 
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female subjects within one session might affect competition decisions made by 
the subjects. We therefore carried out a further analysis which controlled for 
the total number of subjects and the proportion of females in each session, so 
as to see whether our results were robust subject to these factors. As shown in 
Table S3.3, all previous results remained highly significant after further 
controlling for these variables, suggesting that the effect of gender 
composition, if any, did not affect the relationship between competitiveness 
and envy or risk attitude. 
3.5  Discussion 
In this study, we uniquely examined how competitiveness linked to inequity 
aversion and risk attitude in the loss domain as compared to in the gain 
domain. On the one hand, consistent with existing literature which only 
focused on competitions with positive prize structures, our gain-framed 
treatment showed that both envy and risk aversion for gains are linked to 
lower willingness to compete for a positive prize. On the other hand, our 
results also demonstrated that risk aversion for losses was linked to 
significantly higher propensity to compete in the loss-framed treatment. 
Previously only a handful of studies have investigated the association 
between inequity aversion and competitiveness. Among them, two studies that 
are most close to ours are Bartling et al. (2009) and Balafoutas et al. (2012). 
Whereas both identified a negative relation between inequity aversion and 
competitiveness, when breaking the inequity aversion into the two subtypes, 
Bartling et al. (2009) report a significant effect of aheadness aversion 
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(compassion) but not the behindness aversion; in contrast, Balafoutas et al. 
(2012) find the other way around, namely, competitiveness is negatively 
associated with behindness aversion (envy) instead of aheadness aversion 
(compassion). As noted by Balafoutas et al. (2012), the inconsistencies in their 
results might be ascribed to differences in experimental design or subjects’ 
experiences12
2009
, and “the latter certainly call for more work on the relationship 
between competitive behavior and distributional preferences in order to see 
which design choices are important for the results and to get a feeling of how 
robust the results are” (p. 134). Interestingly, although our study was closer to 
Bartling et al. ( ) in terms of both experimental design and subjects’ 
experiences, our result that only envy but not compassion is significantly 
linked to lower competitiveness is more in line with Balafoutas et al. (2012). 
Based on our observation that inequity aversion was not significantly 
associated with competitiveness in the loss domain, we conjecture that the 
effects of inequity aversion is largely dependent on situational and 
environmental factors such as framing and culture, and this might be another 
source of inconsistencies in results observed among various studies. 
The second main finding of this study is the intriguing pattern of relations 
between risk attitude and competitiveness in gain and loss domains. In the 
gain domain, risk affinity was positively associated with competitiveness; 
while in the loss domain the sign of association was reversed. One possible 
explanation for this interesting pattern is a special Singaporean philosophy 
                                                 
12  In Balafoutas et al (2011) study, subjects went through obligatory piece-rate and obligatory 
tournament rounds before the make the choice of payment schemes for the third round; while in Bartling 
et al (2009) and the current study, subjects did not go through the obligatory rounds. 
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called “Kiasu”. In English, Kiasu can be literally translated as “afraid of 
losing/missing out”; on the one hand, Kiasu people are anxious of missing any 
opportunities, they are keen on taking every advantage; on the other hand, 
Kiasu people worry about losing face, they always want to be the winner but 
never the loser13
A number of literatures have shown gender differences in 
competitiveness, and it is commonly observed that females are less 
competitive than males (
. Such Kiasu philosophy implies that, under the gain frame, 
those who eager to win a lottery (risk seeking) will also want to win a 
tournament (more competitive), and therefore the affinity to risk is positively 
correlated with self-selecting to tournament in the gain domain; however, 
when the tournament is labeled with “loser” and “penalty”, those who seek to 
avoid certain losses by choosing the loss lottery (risk seeking) will shy away 
from the tournament (less competitive) to avoid losing face, and therefore 
leads to a negative association between risk aversion and competitiveness in 
the loss domain. 
Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004, Niederle and 
Vesterlund, 2007). However, some recent studies suggest that such gender 
differences are dependent on the type of tasks and stereotypes: whereas males 
are shown to be more competitive in tasks with more male connotation, such 
as a mathematical task, such gender difference is not observed in other tasks 
which are considered as more “gender-neutral” such as verbal tasks (Dreber et 
al., 2014, Große and Riener, 2010), rope-skipping, and dancing (Dreber et al., 
                                                 
13For example, the Kiasu philosophy says “pay only when necessary, quit when you are ahead”; while an 




2011b). To leverage potential effects of these stereotypes on our subjects’ 
competition decision, the current study combined two different types of tasks 
in the competition experiment: the mathematical summation task and the trivia 
questions selected from a mixture of fields including music, geography, history, 
natural sciences, and sports. This might help to explain the non-gender 
difference in competitiveness observed in our results. 
This study contributes to the literature of individual competitiveness in 
the following aspects. First of all, in the gain domain, our results support 
previous findings regarding the role of envy (Balafoutas et al., 2012) and risk 
aversion (Balafoutas et al., 2012, Bartling et al., 2009, Dreber et al., 2014, 
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), both of which are linked to less willingness to 
engage in a competition. Secondly, to our knowledge, this is the first 
experimental study that investigates how these factors relate to 
competitiveness in the loss domain, and we found that people who were more 
risk seeking for losses were significantly less willing to engage in a 
competition with penalty. It is perhaps not surprising to see opposite risk 
attitude towards gains and losses ever since the publication of Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), however, not much study has been done to 
compare the effects of the risk attitude in these two domains, the findings in 
this study shed lights on this issue. The opposite directions of associations 
between risk attitude and competitiveness in gain and loss domains 
accentuates the effects of framing and emotion in decision making process. 
Whereas a gain framed competition arouses people’s ambition to win, the 
losses framed competition induces stronger fear of losing. From this point of 
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view, our investigation supplements the picture of how competitiveness could 
be influenced by risk and social preferences from a different setting. 
Our current findings of gain versus loss comparison have strong 
implications for applied work. Because of the framing effect, which likely 
triggers different emotional responses, positive and negative incentives might 
lead to strikingly different outcomes for the same group of people even if the 
prize structures are essentially the same. In the real world, emotions might have 
strong influences on decision making and behavior, and it is conceivable that 
positive and negative emotions should have differentiated effects both 
biologically and behaviorally. Yet few theoretical studies have incorporated this 
element into consideration. Building on the evidences from the current 
experiment, it seems necessary for future works to formally model emotions 
into the theory. 
It is worth pointing out that the current study only investigated the 
willingness to compete, but not the effort level or efficiency in competition. 
The latter is of great interests for applied game theorists, and therefore is a 
potential direction for future investigation. Another possible extension to 
current study is to identify the causal effects for competitiveness. Naturally, 
inequity aversion and risk attitude are plausible factors that lead to variations 
in competitiveness, but one might also suspect that these are correlated 
through some other omitted factors, and therefore futures studies shall be 
designed with cautious to verify the causality based on the observed 
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Table S1.1 Summary statistics  
A. Demographics  
Singapore  Beijing  Both cities 
 Males 
Female
s Combined  Males Females Combined  Males Females Combined 
 
    
Age 
(years) 
N 990 1133 2123  635 596 1231  1625 1729 3354 
Mean 22.129 20.816 21.428  21.468 20.785 21.137  21.871 20.805 21.321 
SD 1.336 1.440 1.539  3.288 3.417 3.367  2.326 2.319 2.383 
Diff SGP vs BJ: P=0.001  Male vs Female: P=0.000 
Father’s edu. 
(1-8 levels) 
N 2048  1232  3280 
Mean 4.071  3.903  4.008 
SD 1.734  1.468  1.641 
Mother’s edu. 
(1-8 levels) 
N 2063  1228  3291 
Mean 3.605  3.508  3.569 
SD 1.558  1.537  1.551 
Siblings 
N 2126  1237  3363 
Mean 1.490  1.043  1.326 
SD 0.952  1.288  1.109 
Family inc. 
(S$/￥) 
N 1971  1165  
 
Mean 5512.848  4939.18  






 Singapore  Beijing  Both cities 
 Males Females Combined  Males Females Combined  Males Females Combined 
Financial 
investment  
N 993 1140 2133  638 599 1237  1631 1739 3370 
Mean 5.706 5.205 5.438  5.876 5.176 5.538  5.772 5.196 5.475 
SD 2.490 2.240 2.373  2.354 2.272 2.340  2.438 2.251 2.361 
Diff SGP vs BJ: P = 0.240  Male vs Female: P = 0.000 
Even-chance 
lottery  
N 952 1060 2012  558 527 1085  1510 1587 3097 
Mean 5.504 4.976 5.226  5.062 4.596 4.836  5.341 4.850 5.089 
SD 2.538 2.614 2.591  2.210 2.161 2.197  2.430 2.479 2.467 
 SGP vs BJ: P = 0.000  Male vs Female: P = 0.000 
Sure-bet§ 
N 953 1091 2044  605 567 1172  1558 1658 3216 
Mean 3.496 3.223 3.350  3.729 3.335 3.538  3.587 3.261 3.419 
SD 3.314 3.014 3.160  3.142 2.964 3.062  3.250 2.996 3.126 
Diff SGP vs BJ: P = 0.101  Male vs Female: P = 0.003 
Two-tailed t-tests are used for comparisons between cities and between sexes. : For the Financial investment task, the choice number (ranging from 1-10) of 
investment composition is used as dependent variable, with higher number indicating higher risk tolerance. : For the Even-chance lottery task, the switching 
point (ranging from 0 - 10) from lottery to the sure amount is dependent variable, with larger switching point indicating higher risk tolerance. §: For the 
Sure-bet task, 10 minus the switching point (ranging from 0-10) from the sure amount to lottery is dependent variable, with larger number indicating higher 
risk tolerance. Age of participants is measured in years. Father’s and Mother’s education are categorized into eight ordered levels (1-8): 1 = Less than primary 
education, 2 = Completed primary school, 3 = Completed secondary school, 4 = Completed high school or equivalent, 5 = Completed tertiary education, 
including polytechnic, after secondary school, 6 = Completed undergraduate programme with a bachelor degree, 7 = Completed postgraduate programme 
with a master degree, 8 = Completed postgraduate programme with a doctorate degree. Siblings = the number of siblings of participants. The Family income 
reported in this table is the annual family income amount; since the data is not comparable across cities due to differences in currencies and living standards, 
in regressions we classified the income into eight ordered levels according to the distributions of the raw income amount in each city: 1 = 10-percentile, 2 = 




Table S1.2 Genotype and allele frequencies of DRD4 exon III VNTR 
Genotype Count Frequency, %  Alleles Count Frequency, % 
1R/4R 1 0.03%  1R 1 0.02% 
2R/2R 172 5.01%  2R 1388 21.47% 
2R/3R 8 0.23%  3R 66 1.02% 
2R/4R 997 29.04%  4R 5223 80.78% 
2R/5R 28 0.82%  5R 144 2.23% 
2R/6R 8 0.23%  6R 30 0.46% 
2R/7R 3 0.09%  7R 12 0.19% 
3R/3R 1 0.03%  8R 1 0.02% 
3R/4R 53 1.54%  9R 1 0.02% 
3R/5R 1 0.03%     
3R/6R 1 0.03%     
3R/7R 1 0.03%     
4R/4R 2,019 58.81%     
4R/5R 107 3.12%     
4R/6R 18 0.52%     
4R/7R 8 0.23%     
4R/8R 1 0.03%     
5R/5R 4 0.12%     
6R/6R 1 0.03%     
6R/9R 1 0.03%     
Total: 3,433 100.00%   6866 100%  
  
 
Table S1.3 Association between DRD4 exon III VNTR and risk attitude (OLR) 
 Financial investment  Even-chance lottery  Sure-bet§ 
 1 (a) 1 (b) 1 (c) 2 (a) 2 (b) 2 (c) 3 (a) 3 (b) 3 (c) 
DRD4 1.144** 1.144** 1.128* 1.129* 1.152** 1.164** 1.210*** 1.212*** 1.201*** 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.074) (0.072) (0.074) (0.079) (0.076) (0.077) (0.081) 
Female  0.656*** 0.656***  0.680*** 0.678***  0.876** 0.888* 
  (0.041) (0.044)  (0.045) (0. 047)  (0.057) (0.061) 
City  1.133** 1.154**  0.706*** 0.689***  1.148** 1.127* 
  (0.071) (0.078)  (0.045) (0. 048)  (0.074) (0.078) 
Age  1.007 1.011  1.006 0.999  0.993 0.993 
 
 (0.013) (0.013)  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.014) (0.014) 
Father’s edu.   1.006   0.985   1.045 
   (0.028)   (0.027)   (0.029) 
Mother’s edu.   1.012   1.020   0.975 
   (0.030)   (0. 030)   (0.029) 
Siblings   1.010   0.970   0.959 
   (0.031)   (0.028)   (0.028) 
Family inc.   0.997   0.978   0.981 
   (0.017)   (0.016)   (0.017) 
Log likelihood -6934.141 -6746.406 -6072.710 -6587.755 -6396.202 -5757.415 -6731.134 -6578.787 -5933.892 
Observations 3419 3341 3009 3147 3071 2765 3266 3189 2872 
The proportional Odds Ratios from OLR are presented. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; : For the Financial 
investment task, the choice number (ranging from 1 - 10) of investment composition is used as dependent variable, with higher number indicating higher risk 
tolerance. : For the Even-chance lottery task, the switching point (ranging from 0 - 10) from lottery to the sure amount is dependent variable, with larger 
switching point indicating higher risk tolerance. §: For the Sure-bet task, 10 minus the switching point (ranging from 0 -10) from the sure amount to lottery is 
dependent variable, with larger number indicating higher risk tolerance. DRD4 = 0 if participant carries the 4R/4R genotype, 1 otherwise. Female = 0 if 




Table S1.4 Model comparison 
   Vuong statistic 
 Model specification Log-likelihood EUT-Exponential EUT-Power PT-Exponential PT-Power EUT-Expo 𝑢(𝑚𝑘) = −exp (−𝜌 ∗ 𝑚𝑘) 
-112980.797 
    
 
EU𝐿 = � p𝑘 ∗ u(m𝑘)
𝑘=1,2      
EUT-Power 𝑢(𝑚𝑘) = 𝑚𝑘1−𝑟/(1 − 𝑟) 
-114442.221 
-73.294    
 
EU𝐿 = � p𝑘 ∗ u(m𝑘)
𝑘=1,2  (1.000)    
PT-Expo 𝑢(𝑚𝑘) = −exp (−𝜌 ∗ 𝑚𝑘);  
π(pk) = pkγ/(p1γ + p2γ)1/γ 
-119844.776 
-64.371 -50.662 .  
 
V𝐿 = � π(pk) ∗ u(m𝑘)
𝑘=1,2  (1.000) (1.000)   
PT-Power 𝑢(𝑚𝑘) = 𝑚𝑘1−𝑟/(1 − 𝑟);  
π(pk) = pkγ/(p1γ + p2γ)1/γ 
-113246.239 
-5.539 27.414 57.087  
 
V𝐿 = � π(pk) ∗ u(m𝑘)
𝑘=1,2  (1.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Mean-variance U(L) = mean(L) +  β ∗ Var(L) -114910.768 -48.357 -12.508 42.066 -35.523 (1.000) (1.000) (0.000) (1.000) 
Vuong test statistics for H0: Column model is not the better model are reported, positive values imply that the Column model is favoured over the Row model. 




Table S1.5 Association of personality traits with behavioral risk attitude 
 Risk Attitude 
 Financial investment  Even-chance lottery  Sure-bet
§ ρ¶ 
 Odds Ratio. Std. Err. Odds Ratio. Std. Err. Odds Ratio. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. NEO-PI-R         Neuroticism 0.9940*** 0.0018 0.9958** 0.0017 0.9987 0.0018 2.41e-5*** 8.08e-06 
Extraversion 1.0053*** 0.0019 1.0084*** 0.0020 1.0035* 0.0019 -3.07e-5*** 0.001 
Openness to experience 1.0068** 0.0024 1.0078*** 0.0078 1.0034 0.0023 -4.39e-5*** 1.13e-5 
Agreeableness 0.9952** 0.0024 1.0005 0.0026 0.9997 0.0023 2.26e-5* 1.18e-5 
Conscientiousness 1.0012 0.0019 1.0017 0.0019 1.0018 0.0018 -1.21e-5 8.70e-06 
         TCI-R         Novelty seeking 1.0114*** 0.0031 1.0170*** 0.0034 1.0065** 0.0033 -5.92e-5*** 1.62e-5 
Harm avoidance 0.9916** 0.0026 0.9910*** 0.0027 0.9945** 0.0025 5.03e-5*** 1.20e-5 
Reward dependence  0.9962 0.0034 1.0078** 0.0032 1.0011 0.0033 1.80e-06 1.60e-5 
Persistence  1.0043 0.0027 1.0060** 0.0025 1.0045 0.0025 -3.58e-5  1.17e-5 
Self-directedness 1.0003 0.0027 1.0007 0.0028 0.9995 0.0026 -1.04e-5 1.29e-5 
Cooperativeness 0.9975 0.0029 0.9998 0.0029 0.9999 0.0029 1.03e-5 1.41e-5 
Self-transcendence 0.9963 0.0034 0.9994 0.0033 0.9978 0.0035 1.53e-5 1.57e-5 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; : For the Financial investment task, the choice number (ranging from 1-10) of investment composition was used as 
dependent variable, with higher number indicating higher risk tolerance; OLR with robust SEs were used, Odds Ratio are presented. :For the Even-chance 
lottery, the switching point (ranging from 0-10) from the sure amount to lottery was dependent variable, with larger number indicating higher risk tolerance; 
OLR with robust SEs were used , Odds Ratio are presented. §: For the Sure-bet task, 10 minus the switching point (ranging from 0 - 10) from the sure amount 
to lottery was dependent variable, with larger number indicating higher risk tolerance; OLR with robust SEs were used, Odds Ratio are presented. ¶: Risk 
aversion coefficient ρ was estimated as a function of individual differences using computational method, clustered SEs were used, the coefficients are presented 




Table S1.6 Association of personality traits and DRD4 exon III VNTR 
 DRD4 exon III VNTR 
 Coeff. Std Err. P-value NEO-PI-R    Neuroticism -1.2851 0.8611 0.136 
Extraversion -0.1357 0.7722 0.861 
Openness to experience -0.0077 0.6384 0.990 
Agreeableness -0.0363 0.6117 0.953 
Conscientiousness 0.2701 0.7633 0.723 
  
  TCI-R    Novelty seeking 0.2286 0.5532 0.679 
Harm avoidance -0.2762 0.7253 0.703 
Reward dependence  -0.4549 0.5667 0.422 
Persistence  -0.0083 0.6983 0.990 
Self-directedness -0.5798 0.6782 0.393 
Cooperativeness -0.1843 0.6065 0.761 
Self-transcendence 0.4438 0.5477 0.418 
Scores of each personality scales were used as dependent variable in separated linear 
regressions; DRD4 = 0 if participant carries the 4R/4R genotype, 1 otherwise. All 
regressions and estimations controlled for sex, city, and age.  
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Figure S1.1 Distribution of responses  
 
(A) Distribution of responses in Financial investment. The x-axis is the index of 
investment options in the Financial investment task, ranging from 1-10 with higher 
number being less risk averse, and y-axis shows the frequency of each option being 
chosen. (B) Distribution of responses in Even-chance lottery task. The x-axis is the 
switching point from Option A to Option B, which ranges from 0-10. The circled 
number on x-axis is the serial number of the risk-neutral task, in which the expected 
value of the lottery equals the sure amount in the safe option, a smaller switching point 
indicates risk aversion and a bigger index implies risk affinity; y-axis is the frequency 
of each switching point in the Even-chance lottery task. (C) Distribution of responses 
in sure-bet task. In contrast to the Even-chance lottery, the x-axis now exhibits 10 
minus the switching point, so that a higher number corresponds to less risk aversion, 
and the circled number corresponds to risk-neutrality. Y-axis shows the frequency of 
responses in the sure-bet task. In all three panels, responses in Singapore are presented 


































































Text S1.1: Experimental Instructions 
(This English version was used in Singapore, while a Chinese version of this 
instruction was used in Beijing; the translation was done by two independent 
translators and comparisons were made by another independent translator. The 
amounts of prizes in Beijing were four times as large as those in Singapore, and were 
nominated in RMB.) 
Financial investment task 
In this task, you are endowed with $27. You have the option to invest an amount on an 
experimental stock constructed from a deck of 20 cards comprising 10 black cards and 
10 red cards. For every dollar invested, you receive $2.5 if you guess the color of a 
randomly drawn card correctly. Otherwise, you receive $0 and lose your investment. 
The following table displays your investment options which consist of investing 
between $0 and $27 in steps of $3 in this experimental stock and keeping the rest as 
cash. The last two columns indicate your Total Earnings given by Cash + Investment 
Return for the cases of correct and incorrect guesses respectively. 
DECISION: For the following 10 investment options listed in the table below in an 
ascending manner in terms of the amount of investment, please indicate the one option 
that you most prefer with a tick (√).   
Investment Total Earnings 
 √ Cash Invest 
Correct Incorrect 
Guess Guess 
1  $27.00 $0.00 $27.00 $27.00 
2  $24.00 $3.00 $31.50 $24.00 
3  $21.00 $6.00 $36.00 $21.00 
4  $18.00 $9.00 $40.50 $18.00 
5  $15.00 $12.00 $45.00 $15.00 
6  $12.00 $15.00 $49.50 $12.00 
7  $9.00 $18.00 $54.00 $9.00 
8  $6.00 $21.00 $58.50 $6.00 
9  $3.00 $24.00 $63.00 $3.00 





This situation involves your guessing the color – red or black – of a card drawn 
randomly from a deck of 20 cards, comprising 10 black cards and 10 red cards.  
Option A: You guess the color – black or red – and then draw a card from the deck of 
20 cards. If you make a correct guess, you receive $60; otherwise, you receive nothing. 
That is: 50% chance of receiving $60 and 50% chance of receiving $0. 
The Option B column lists 10 amounts
DECISION: For each of the 10 rows, please indicate your decision in the final column 
with a tick (√).  
 (displayed in an ascending manner) each 
corresponding to what you will receive for sure if you choose this option.  
 Option A Option B Decision 
1 50% of receiving $60, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $15 for sure A     B   
2 50% of receiving $60, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $19 for sure A     B   
3 50% of receiving $60, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $23 for sure A     B   
4 50% of receiving $60, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $25 for sure A     B   
5 50% of receiving $60, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $27 for sure A     B   
6 50% of receiving $60, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $29 for sure A     B   
7 50% of receiving $60, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $30 for sure A     B   
8 50% of receiving $60, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $31 for sure A     B   
9 50% of receiving $60, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $33 for sure A     B   







Option A: Receiving $30 for sure 
The Option B column lists different chances of receiving $60 and receiving $0 
otherwise
DECISION: For each of the 10 rows in the table below, please indicate your decision 
in the final column with a tick (√).  
. (Notice the chances of receiving $60 are displayed in an ascending 
manner.) 
 
 Option A Option B Decision 
1 Receiving $30 for sure 48% of receiving $60, 52% of receiving $0 A     B   
2 Receiving $30 for sure 50% of receiving $60, 50% of receiving $0 A     B   
3 Receiving $30 for sure 52% of receiving $60, 48% of receiving $0 A     B   
4 Receiving $30 for sure 54% of receiving $60, 46% of receiving $0 A     B   
5 Receiving $30 for sure 56% of receiving $60, 44% of receiving $0 A     B   
6 Receiving $30 for sure 58% of receiving $60, 42% of receiving $0 A     B   
7 Receiving $30 for sure 60% of receiving $60, 40% of receiving $0 A     B   
8 Receiving $30 for sure 62% of receiving $60, 38% of receiving $0 A     B   
9 Receiving $30 for sure 64% of receiving $60, 36% of receiving $0 A     B   





Text S1.2: Model specification of computational estimation 
In the computational estimation, we assumed that subjects make their choices 
according to the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) with exponential utility specification. 
Specifically, the utility of outcome mk is defined as: 
𝑢(𝑚𝑘) = −exp (−𝜌 ∗ 𝑚𝑘)                          (1) 
where ρ > 0 is the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion. 
To estimate risk preference elicited by the Even-chance lottery and Sure-bet tasks, 
according to EUT, the expected utility of lottery L with two outcomes is simply the 
sum of probability weighted utility of each outcome k of this lottery 
     EU𝐿 = ∑ p𝑘 ∗ u(m𝑘)𝑘=1,2                        (2) 
And the expected utility of the safe option S with the sure payoff 𝑚𝑆 is then 
given by: EU𝑆 = u(𝑚𝑆)                    (3) 
For the Even-chance lottery and Sure-bet task where subjects need to choose 
between a lottery versus a certain amount, a latent index  ∇EU is calculated to 
represent the latent preference and the probability of choosing the safe option: 
prob(choose safe option 𝑆) = ∇EU = exp (1μ∗EU𝑆)
exp (1
μ
∗EU𝐿)+exp (1μ∗EU𝑆)      (4) 
By construction, the latent index ∇EU is a number between 0 and 1. In this 
specification, μ is a stochastic noise parameter that accounts for the errors in decision 
making process (Luce error specification): when μ approaches 0, the probability of 
choosing the option with higher expected utility approaches 1; however, as μ gets 
larger, the probability of choosing the “wrong option” increases, and when μ → ∞, the 
decision maker acts randomly and the probability of choosing the lottery is 1/2.  
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We use maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method to estimate the 
parameters as specified above, and the log likelihood function for the Even-chance 
lottery and Sure-bet task is then given by: ln LS(R, μ; y, X) = ∑ ∑ (�ln∇EU �yigS = 1� + �ln(1 − ∇EU) �yigS = 0�g )i      (5) 
Where yigS = 1 (0) denotes individual i’s choice of the safe (lottery) option in 
row g of the Even-chance lottery or the Sure-bet task.  
Similarly, for the Financial investment task, the expected utility of a portfolio f 
with two outcomes {win, lose} is the sum of probability weighted utility of each 
outcome j of this lottery: EU𝑓 = ∑ p𝑗 ∗ u(m𝑗)𝑗=win,lose                        (6) 
Where 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10}, and F is the set of portfolio alternatives, 
with options 1 to 10 each representing an investment plan. 
The latent index  ∇EU𝑓 of each option f corresponding to the probability of 
choosing the portfolio option f is then defined as: 
prob(choose 𝑓) = ∇EU𝑓 = exp (1μ∗EU𝑓)∑ exp (1
μ
∗EU𝑓)10𝑓=1  𝑓 = 1,2, … 10.           (7) 
The log likelihood function for the Financial investment task can be written as: ln LI(R, μ; y, X) = ∑ �ln∇EU𝑓 �yiI = 𝑓�i                   (8) 
Where yiI = 𝑓 indicates individual i’s choice in the investment task. 
Moreover, we allow the risk aversion coefficient ρ to be a linear function of 
observed individual characteristics, including the DRD4 exon III polymorphism, of 
the subjects: 
ρ� = ρ0� + β� ∗ X                               (9) 
Where X is a vector of observed individual characteristics, and β� is the vector 
 112 
 
of estimated coefficients for these characteristics. 
Finally, we combine the log likelihood of the three tasks to estimate the overall 
risk aversion coefficient, and the joint log likelihood function is calculated as the 
weighted sum of log likelihood functions for the three tasks. Note that for each 
individual, the Even-chance lottery and Sure-bet tasks both involve 10 decisions to 
make, which generate 10 log likelihood functions each; while the Financial 
investment task involves only one. In order to balance the weight of these tasks, we 
multiply the log likelihood function for the Financial investment task by 10, so the 





Table S2.1 Predicted GR for the three dimensions 
 R=1/3 R=1/2 R=1 R=2 R=3 
Hobbesian 0 0 0 0 0 
Coasian 0 0 [0, 1] 1 1 




   
  
Table S2.2 Distribution of religion categories by DRD4 exon III VNTR genotype 
 No Religion Christian B&T Other Religions Total 
Genotypes Freq Prop (%) Freq Prop (%) Freq Prop (%) Freq Prop (%)  
4R/4R 580 45.60 368 28.93 317 24.92 7 0.55 1272 
Non-4R/4R  420 45.70 265 28.84 227 24.70 7 0.76 919 







Figure S2.1 Distribution of alleles and genotypes 
 
(A)  
 (B)   
 
(A) DRD4 exon III VNTR allele distribution. The x-axis is the number of repeats of 
the DRD4 exon III VNTR polymorphism, 2-9 repeats are observed in our sample; 
y-axis shows the percentage of each variant. (B) DRD4 Exon III VNTR genotype 
distribution. The x-axis shows the observed genotype variants; y-axis is the 








































































(A) Distribution of Hobbesian deviation. The x-axis is the deviation from prototype 
Hobbesian behavior, ranging from 0-1; y-axis shows the percentage of corresponding 
deviation. (B) Distribution of Coasian deviation. The x-axis is the deviation from 
prototype Coasian behavior, ranging from 0-1; y-axis shows the percentage of corresponding 
deviation. (C) Distribution of Rawlsian deviation. The x-axis is the deviation from 






























(A) Hobbesian deviation across religious groups. The x-axis represents No 
Religion, Christian, and B-T groups; y-axis shows the average Hobbesian deviation in 
corresponding group. (B) Coasian deviation across religious groups. The x-axis 
represents No Religion, Christian, and B-T groups; y-axis shows the average Coasian 
deviation in corresponding group. (C) Rawlsian deviation across religious groups. 
The x-axis represents No Religion, Christian, and B-T groups; y-axis shows the 
































































In this situation, Person A is endowed a fixed amount of money, and is asked 
what amount of money he/she wants to send to Person B. Person B makes no 
decision. The amount of money Person A sends to Person B will be multiplied 
by a factor R. That is, Person B will receive R dollars for every dollar sent by 
Person A. The amounts that Person A and Person B receive depend solely on 
how Person A decides to allocate the money.  
Experimental Instruction 
Example 1 (Endowed with $50; factor R = 2): Person A can either keep all $50, 
keep some and send the balance, or send all of $50 to an anonymous and 
randomly matched Person B. For every dollar sent by Person A, Person B will 
receive $2. If Person A keeps $50 and sends $0, Person B will receive $0 while 
Person A will keep $50. If Person A sends all $50, Person B will receive $50 x 2 
= $100 while Person A will have $0.  
Example 2:(Endowed with $30; factor R = 1/3)
Your decision as Person A: 
: Person A can send up to $30. 
Person B receives $1/3 for every dollar sent by Person A. 
For each of the 5 cases below, please indicate the 
amount you would keep and the amount you would send. In each case, the sum 
of the amount of money you keep and the amount to be sent must equal
 
 your 
endowed amount as shown in the final column. 
 
 Endowed Amount Factor R Amount Kept Amount Sent Total 
1 $40 2   $40 
2 $20 3   $20 
3 $40 1/2   $40 
4 $60 1/3   $60 






Table S3.1 Summary statistics of demographics 
  Min Max Avg. S.D. 
# Siblings 0 5 1.435 1.162 
Fam.inc. level 1 7 2.491 1.469 
Age 
Male 20 27 22.242 1.751 
Female 19 26 21.173 1.465 





Table S3.2 Summary statistics of ability and beliefs 
  Range Female Male Combined p-value1 
Ability [0,1] 0.262 0.265 0.263 0.863 
Overconfidence [-1,1] 0.008 0.015 0.010 0.903 
Subjective winning prob.  [0,1] 0.367 0.493 0.405 0.023 






Table S3. 3 Regression results controlling for session specific factors (Probit) 
Probit (1) (2) (3) 
DV: Tournament Pooled Gain Loss 
Compassion -0.145 -0.268 0.138 
 (0.139) (0.211) (0.173) 
Envy -0.492*** -0.455*** 0.179 
 (0.195) (0.154) (0.159) 
SP_Gain  0.060* 0.094** -0.029 
   (0.040) (0.036) (0.029) 
SP_Loss  -0.054* 0.008 -0.147*** 
   (0.042) (0.032) (0.036) 
SP_Mixed  -0.030   
   (0.032)   
Loss  0.960**   
 (0.101)   
Loss*Compassion -0.371**   
 (0.153)   
Loss*Envy 0.747**   
 (0.270)   
Loss * SP_Gain  -0.276***   
   (0.096)   
Loss * SP_Loss  -0.416***   
   (0.102)   
Loss*SP_Mixed  0.340***   
   (0.117)   
Log likelihood  -16.82 -21.10 -20.55 
Observations  62 47 49 
Marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses;*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p 
< 0.01; Dependent variable is Tournament dummy: 1 = chose Tournament payment scheme 
for the real-effort phase, 0 = otherwise. Compassion: 1 = being compassion type, 0 = 
otherwise. Envy: 1 = being envy type, 0 = otherwise. Risk in gains, losses, and mixed lotteries 
are the switching points in these tasks, respectively, a higher number indicates higher risk 
affinity. Loss: 1 = loss treatment, 0 = gain treatment. All regressions controlled for 
Demographics (female, age, number of siblings, and family income level), Beliefs (ability, 
overconfidence and subjective winning probability), and Session specific factors (number of 





Figure S3.1 Distribution of responses in lottery tasks 
 
 
(A) NR in gain lottery task. The x-axis is the number of risky choices being chosen in the gain 
lottery task, ranging from 1-10 with higher number being less risk averse, and y-axis shows the 
density of each index. (B) NR in loss lottery task. The x-axis is the number of risky choices being 
chosen in the loss lottery task, and y-axis shows the density of each index. (C) NR in mixed lottery 
task. The x-axis is the number of risky choices being chosen in the mixed lottery task, and y-axis 
shows the density of each index (D) SP in gain lottery task. The x-axis is the switching point from 
the lottery to the sure amount in the gain lottery task, ranging from 1-10 with higher number being 
less risk averse, and y-axis shows the density of each index. (E) SP in loss lottery task. The x-axis 
is the switching point from the lottery to the sure amount in the loss lottery task, and y-axis shows 
the density of each index. (F) SP in mixed lottery task. The x-axis is the switching point from the 










Experiment 1: Distribution task 
 
(The six tasks in experiment 1 are listed below, and were displayed as shown in the 
example of screenshot) 
Tasks Option A Option B Option C Your Choice 
Task 1 You receive:  15 ECU  PP receives:  24 ECU 
You receive:  20 ECU  
PP receives:  20 ECU 
Indifferent between 
Option A and Option B A  B  C 
Task 2 You receive:  20 ECU  PP receives:  24 ECU 
You receive:  20 ECU  
PP receives:  20 ECU 
Indifferent between 
Option A and Option B A  B  C 
Task 3 You receive:  22 ECU  PP receives:  24 ECU 
You receive:  20 ECU  
PP receives:  20 ECU 
Indifferent between 
Option A and Option B A  B  C 
Task 4 You receive:  18 ECU  PP receives:  16 ECU 
You receive:  20 ECU  
PP receives:  20 ECU 
Indifferent between 
Option A and Option B A  B  C 
Task 5 You receive:  20 ECU  PP receives:  16 ECU 
You receive:  20 ECU  
PP receives:  20 ECU 
Indifferent between 
Option A and Option B A  B  C 
Task 6 You receive:  25 ECU  PP receives:  16 ECU 
You receive:  20 ECU  
PP receives:  20 ECU 
Indifferent between 

























































(Gain treatment, Tournament) 
 























Text S3.2: Questionnaire 
 
 
